

TRANSFORMATION OF THE IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE GLOBAL
SOUTH: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TEMPORARY PROTECTION
STATUS IN TURKEY AND COLOMBIA

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PROTECTION STATUS IN TURKEY AND COLOMBIA**

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ABSTRACT

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Since the early 2010s, the world has been experiencing significant immigration movements with serious consequences. As the countries most affected by these movements, Colombia and Turkey faced the urgency of designing and implementing new immigration policies to minimize the effects of immigration. This study aims to compare immigration policies in Turkey and Colombia, especially in terms of temporary protection status granted to Syrians and Venezuelans, respectively. With the crises in Syria and Venezuela, the fact that the risks of mass immigration movements in the world may increase has started to be discussed more. As a result, different countries such as Turkey and Colombia have created similar policies within the framework of existing immigration management principles. This is because, as a result, Turkey and Colombia as different countries implement similar policies within the framework of their existing concepts of immigration management principles. The reason for this is that current immigration principles do not respond to these crises within the scope of the policies that countries want to implement. Countries approach mass immigration movements more softly and temporarily and build their policies on

this ground. Country policies develop temporary protection policies in order to control the effects of the crises in a soft and ad-hoc manner, which will minimize the negative effects of the current situation, instead of solving the crises. In this context, it continued by focusing on how they responded to the massive immigration flow from Syria and Venezuela over the examples of Turkey and Colombia, and the similarities and differences in immigration policies regarding Venezuelans under temporary protection status and Syrians. Although Turkey and Colombia have very different characteristics in different continents, with different languages, religions, cultures and social structures, both countries have responded to the mass immigration flows they host within the framework of the principle of applying temporary protection status.

Keywords: Immigration Policy, Temporary Protection, Refugee, Turkey, Colombia

ÖZ

KÜRESEL GÜNEY’DE GÖÇ POLİTİKALARININ DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: TÜRKİYE VE KOLOMBİYA’DAKİ GEÇİCİ KORUMA STATÜSÜNÜN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ

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2010'ların başından bu yana, dünya ciddi sonuçları olan önemli göç hareketlerini yaşıyor. Bu hareketlerden en çok etkilenen ülkeler olarak Kolombiya ve Türkiye, göçün etkilerini en aza indirmek için yeni göç politikaları tasarlama ve uygulama aciliyetiyle karşı karşıya kaldılar. Bu çalışma, Türkiye ve Kolombiya'daki göç politikalarını, özellikle sırasıyla Suriyelilere ve Venezuelalılara verilen geçici koruma statüsü açısından karşılaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Suriye ve Venezüella'da yaşanan krizlerle birlikte dünyada kitlesel göç hareketlerinin risklerinin artabileceği olgusu daha fazla tartışılmaya başlandı. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye ve Kolombiya gibi farklı ülkeler, mevcut göç idaresi ilkeleri çerçevesinde benzer politikalar geliştirmiştir. Bunun sebebi ise mevcut göç prensiplerinin bu krizlere ülkelerin uygulamak istedikleri politikalar kapsamında cevap vermemesidir. Ülkeler kitlesel göç hareketlerine daha yumuşak ve geçici olarak yaklaşmakta ve politikalarını bu zemin üzerine inşa etmektedirler. Ülke politikaları krizleri çözmek yerine mevcut durumun olumsuz etkilerini en aza indirecek, krizlerin etkilerini yumuşak ve geçici olarak kontrol altına almak için geçici koruma politikaları geliştirmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye ve

Kolombiya örnekleri üzerinden Suriye ve Venezüella'dan gelen yoğun göç akışına nasıl tepki verdikleri, geçici koruma statüsündeki Venezüellalılar ve Suriyelilere ilişkin göç politikalarındaki benzerlikler ve farklılıklara odaklanarak devam edilmiştir. Türkiye ve Kolombiya farklı kıtalarda, farklı diller, dinler, kültürler ve sosyal yapılarla çok farklı özelliklere sahip olsa da, her iki ülke de ev sahipliği yaptıkları kitlesel göç akışlarına geçici koruma statüsü uygulama prensibi çerçevesinde yanıt vermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Göç Politikası, Geçici Koruma, Sığınmacı, Türkiye, Kolombiya

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DGMM	Directorate General for Immigration Management of Turkey
EU	European Union
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
IOM	International Organization for Immigration
MERCOSUR	The Southern Common Market
OAS	The Organization of American States
PEP	The Special Permit of Permanence
TPS	Temporary Protection Status
TPV	Temporary Protection Visas
SuTPs	Temporary Protection Status of Syrians in Turkey
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Immigration has become one of the most important phenomena in the world with different intensities and dynamics in each region. In the context of the changes and crises dynamics brought by globalization, there has been an increasing trend of displacement in the world. As a result of this trend, the world is now hosting 89.3 million displaced people: 48 million internally displaced people or immigrants, almost 27 million refugees, almost 4.5 million asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2021a). Moreover, refugee and asylum seeker applications (Castles & Miller, 2008) and immigration movements have increased rapidly since the last five decades and are continuing to increase (IOM, 2019). The two continents, Europe and Asia have the highest number of immigrants: these two continents comprise 61% of all migrants in the world, with around 87 million migrants. However, other regions also experience the immigration phenomenon. For instance, Latin America consists of 5 % (IOM, 2022a) and MENA region consists 30.6 % of all migrants in the world (Harjanto & Batalova, 2022).

While immigration has become such an important phenomenon as a result of the increment of the immigration waves, the scholarly literature on immigration studies has flourished. The ways in which immigration routes have impacted the countries throughout the route have been widely discussed in the literature. Considering that immigration is a very comprehensive and long-term process, it is a phenomenon that brings different dynamics with complex dimensions into the fore (Castles & Miller, 2008). Since the discussions and analyses of immigration has been handled from different perspectives, the definitions of concepts have become more and more important to be able to have a common conceptual ground between different approaches.

New conceptualization of these concepts has begun to be explored also depending on the reasons why people leave or must leave their places/homes. For instance, the students and scholars of immigration studies have been trying to agree upon common definitions of migrant, refugee and asylum seeker. Besides examining the causes and consequences of immigration, the new immigration routes and new regional tensions leading to immigration have also been examined. The new tendencies of movement are rather interestingly unexpected. On a global scale vast majority of people reside in poorer countries. Instead of migrating to the developed countries, majority of refugees and displaced people live in their neighboring countries remaining within the poor or medium-income countries as in the cases of Turkey and Colombia (Bartram et al., 2017).

The Syrian and Venezuelan immigration waves unearthed the national and global challenges of the ad-hoc immigration policy making. After Syrian Civil War in Syria, millions of people had to leave Syria and started to reside in other countries. Secondly, Venezuelan political and economic turmoil have caused millions of people to migrate. As a result of these two events, the two countries most affected were Turkey and Colombia, the border neighbors of the sending countries. Although these two countries are the countries that have felt the effects of immigration the most, Europe and North America were also challenged by these two waves of immigration. The unexpected relocation of vast number of people in a short time has caused countries to develop their immigration policies or create new practices rather ad hoc fashion. States needed effective and well-formulated immigration policies to deal with these mass immigrant movements. In immigration policies, states typically use public tools and employees to implement policies and sometimes cooperate with NGOs and international organizations for this purpose. Immigration policies are by nature complex policy schemes because they need to consider multiple factors and take into account other legal regulations implemented at the same time on related matters. The immigration policies inevitably rely on the earlier experiences in different regions of the world. Countries must develop their immigration policies according to the universally agreed principles of immigration management. It is therefore essential to understand what immigration management has been. Although there have been different definitions of immigration management, according to IOM, it means "a planned approach to

development policies, to make legislation and regulations to address key immigration issues " (IOM, 2009, p. 22). Although each country has different dynamics and they happen to respond to different waves of immigrants, similar immigration policies are motivated by the common frame of immigration management. This thesis focuses on comparative case on implementing specific immigration policies after Venezuelan emigration to Colombia and Syrian to Turkey. Comparing Venezuelans and Syrians immigration would derive insights about the dominant global principles of immigration management principles as these two have been the biggest waves of immigration of the last decades.

The case selection justification of the thesis is quite straight forward: Turkey is the country hosts the world's largest number of displaced populations, while Colombia is in the second (UNHCR, 2021a). As a result of the civil war in Syria erupting in mid-2011, a major refugee shock especially for the neighboring countries and the whole world has begun to be experienced. Currently, the 7.3 million Syrian constitute the most significant emigrant population (UNHCR, 2022a). The increase in the number of refugees worldwide as a result of the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 brought the issue of policy response for refugees and immigrants into the agenda. As a consequence, the civil war has affected the Europe and Middle East and North Africa region. All immigrant-receiving countries have faced many short and long-term effects. Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, as the neighbors of Syria, have been the countries affected the most by this population flow. However, some countries in the region have experienced consequences more than other countries like Turkey. Since Turkey both host and transit country which hosts 3.7 million Syrian under temporary protection status. A parallel situation experienced in the Latin America region reminiscent of the case of Europe and the Middle East and the North Africa region. The Venezuelan immigration has also caused a big regional challenge with 6.1 million displaced Venezuelan (UNHCR, 2022b). When considered territorially, Latin America had never experienced a immigration crisis at this magnitude before. Since 2017 when political and economic crises erupted in Venezuela, 15% of the Venezuelans had to leave their country. As of 2022, more than six million Venezuelans left their country, and five million of them continue their lives in other countries in the same continent. Neighboring countries like Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Brazil have faced the same

experience as in the Syria situation. It should be noted that, Peru hosts 1.3 million, Ecuador hosts 513 thousand and Brazil hosts 345 thousand of Venezuelans. As Turkey hosts the majority of Syrians, Colombia hosts almost 1.8 million Venezuelans with holding temporary protection status (UNHCR, 2021a).

Both in the Syrian and Venezuelan cases, it is necessary to take into account the regional dynamics. With this motivation, this thesis focuses on regional common immigration policy attempts as well. To understand the attempts, it would be necessary gather and analyze the available quantitative data set. Like in the case of Turkey, Colombia is not only a destination country but also a transit country. Both Turkey and Colombia have received a massive immigration wave in rather a short period time which challenged the policy responses in both countries. Turkey received a massive Syrian population between 2013 and 2016, while Colombia has received a massive Venezuelan flow between 2015 and 2018. Both Turkey and Colombia along with the other neighboring countries in both regions had to craft policies increasing the bureaucratic and management capabilities in order to deal with this population. Even if the migrants and the host society have very similar cultural and to a certain extent political backgrounds, a common religion (in both cases) and language (in the Colombian case), the migrate affects the socio-cultural and political economic context of the host countries. In order to manage the multi-faceted effects of immigration, Turkey and Colombia experienced new dynamics of change and attempted to create an opportunity to seek and build effective and sustained immigration policies. Consequently, Turkey and Colombia launched new legal regulations and institutional framework in dealing with the immigration issue.

The first humanitarian reaction in both Turkey and Colombia was to implement an open-door policy albeit with specific differences. Although regional immigration shock was a relatively new phenomenon for Turkey, the government implemented an open-door policy for Syrians. Likewise, Colombia began to build its policies on this basis of open-door policy which had already been a shared immigration policy in Latin America. However, despite the open-door policies in both countries, the next step was to formulate a policy which would minimize manage the possible long-term impact of these waves in these countries. In this matter, an earlier experience in European Union,

the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s has become an exemplary case for the current crisis. In this case, the Bosnian asylum seekers were granted temporary protection instead of a full refugee status. Similar to this earlier experience, the Syrians crossing Turkey were not legally accepted as ‘refugee’ due to Turkey's geographical restriction on the 1951 Geneva Convention. Consequently 95 % of 4 million Syrians in Turkey are brought under an ‘temporary protection status’ (İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2022). It meant that the majority of the population would be registered and brought under the government's control while benefiting from social services and rights. Colombian state provides temporary protection status to 1.8 million Venezuelan residing in Colombia and their status valid for ten years (UNHCR, 2021a). Creating and implementing process of temporary protection status in Colombia has cumulative stages. Respectively, state implemented the Border Mobility Card, the Entry and Permanence Permit, the Special Stay Permit to control and register massive immigration flow from Venezuela (ILO, 2021). Temporary protection status in Colombia allows people with this status to access basic rights and services as in Turkey.

This study aims to contribute to this literature dwelling on the problems concerning these two displacement outflows of Venezuelans and Syrians in a comparative perspective., While The risk of massive immigration movements from the conflict-ridden and less-developed regions have started to increase in the world. the Syrian and Venezuelan immigration crises have become an alarming laboratory cases for the global immigration management. Taking the examples of Turkey and Colombia where countries responded to massive immigration movements on the basis of temporary management principles, it is possible to outline the current global immigration management policies. The Turkish and Colombian cases have provided suitable cases for the new tendencies of “temporary protection” principles.

As a result of externalizing the immigration routes away from the relatively rich and stable regions, previous first-entry or transit countries that are typically the neighboring countries have become the host countries. These new host countries have relatively less capacity to ensure asylum protection in accordance with international standards. In other words, the resources of these countries are typically insufficient to deal with the scale of the crises on their own. Consequently, the policies are designed

to minimize the immediate negative effects of the current situation. Therefore, the governments resort to apply temporary protection practices. To understand and explain the mechanisms behind this new immigration managementality, this thesis focuses on parallel cases of Turkey and Colombia. Even though Turkey and Colombia are located in different continents and have different cultures, languages, and religions, they happen to share similar immigration experiences.

This thesis is important because there is a very limited research in the literature that focuses on analyzing why countries like Turkey and Colombia have been experiencing the same immigration situation and have been implementing similar immigration policies. The thesis aims to identify the differences and similarities between the immigration policies crafted in Turkey and Colombia. Therefore, the thesis tackles the research question of how the immigration policies of different countries with similar immigration experiences have been shaped in the concept of similar temporary protection status apart from the international agreements they accede. It compares the immigration policy frameworks focusing on legal agreements, historical backgrounds, countries' experiences, and the policy implementation process in both countries. The analysis will focus on the immigration policies in Colombia as a reference case to make sense of the Turkish case. The thesis will problematize the terminology of refugee as in both cases, the term refugee has been used with reservations. The term refugee, which ought to have a humanitarian content, has become a part and parcel of the foreign policy of the governments with strong implications on rivalry in the domestic politics. The answers will be sought in the cases of Colombia and Turkey. United Nations agencies, which carry out the most comprehensive studies in this field, serve as a reservoir of immigration-related data. Therefore, in this thesis, this study often provides from the data of United Nations agencies. Using their data will be a guide for the number of estimated displaced people in both countries. The data gathered from the relevant literature as well as from publicly available surveys/interviews.

In order to carry out all this study and to find an answer to the research question, this thesis contains six chapters. Chapter 2 will provide a literature review on global immigration trends and waves as well as the theoretical and conceptual approaches to

immigration. Chapter 3 starts with Latin American immigration policy and important agreements based on immigration because the Colombian immigration policy was shaped in this common immigration policies in the region. In this chapter, the situation in Colombia and Venezuela is also discussed to provide an understanding as to why Venezuelans emigrated and how Colombia responded to the problem. This discussion aims to shed light on specific reasons and factors for the Venezuelans emigration. In Chapter 3, Colombian immigration policy and the developments that eventually led to temporary protection status for Venezuelans. This chapter covers the implications of this policy framework. Chapter 4 discusses the Turkish case with historical background of immigration and the Syrian immigration in particular. This chapter reviews the factors behind Syrian immigration flow with a general profile of Syrians in Turkey. The Chapter 4 also elaborates on notion of temporary protection status designed especially for Syrians.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND FRAMEWORK

This section focuses on the definitions that paved the way for the establishment of temporary protection status. When we look at the historical development of the concepts related to immigration and immigrants, it is seen that it is very difficult to come up with commonly agreed definitions. This thesis and this chapter problematizes the lack of a universally accepted terminology concerning immigration in the relevant literature. Even if common definitions cannot be reached for some terms, owing to international agreements some attempts of fixing common definitions has been experienced. This section explains the definitions of central terms in the international agreements of international institutions working in the field of immigration. Six foundational definitions; migrant, refugee, asylum seeker, country of destination and country of transit, temporary protection status. The reason for mentioning these explanations and their historical development is that the basic rights recognized (or not recognized) in immigration policies advance on these concepts. In addition to these points, this chapter focuses on the examples of how the temporary protection status, which is the subject of this thesis, emerged and was first applied.

2.1 The Historical Account of Immigration

People have found themselves displaced individually, collectively and massively for various reasons at various times. This movement is named as immigration. Immigration phenomenon is the oldest as the history of humanity. With the emergence of slavery, enslaved people were brought from Africa, and the slave trade started to meet the labor needs of the West (Williams, 1944). The pre-existing slavery situation increased with colonialism and to solve this labor issue people had to move. There

have been many reasons that might lead to immigration as conflicts between nations, war, natural disasters, economic problems. When looking at the history of immigration waves, we can clearly see these differences. Especially during World War I and II, many people had to leave their homelands due to life threatening risks and lack of sources. During the war times, especially the World War II, many people sought for a refugee status to escape from the increased violence. The phenomenon of immigration also differs due to the reasons for immigration and the characteristics of the emigrated and immigrated place.

Again, in the changing state system dynamics and reformation process, in the wake of World War I and World War II, also initiated another wave of population movements. In Western Europe, due to the labor shortage caused by loss millions of civilian lives together with the wide scope of destruction of the wars, guest workers were invited from underdeveloped and developing countries. This bold mark of the global immigration policies of this time is European countries were welcoming the migrant workers as part of the post-war resettlement of the countries. These migrant workers were considered to be the constitutive elements of the post-war resettlement. These immigrants were the much needed labor force for rebuilding Europe.

Later in the Cold War period, millions of people were displaced in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. This wave of immigration was different from the migrant workers in Europe was their move was motivated by the changes in the sending country. The labor market in Europe at the time had already saturated, new guest workers were not as needed as it was in the aftermath of the second World War. Furthermore, the population movement due to the disintegration of Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia were in different size as well. Especially the outbreak of the war in the former Yugoslavia required a new policy reaction from the European counties. Temporary protection was granted to the people who fled to war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s. This new status was to provide the protection for those who needed it for a safe period of time without granting a full refugee status. The restricted asylum conditions were to meet the protection demands from the international organization and humanitarian expectation of the public opinion (Koser &Black, 1999).

The regional and local wars and conflicts continue to occur today due to domestic and international power struggles. To flee from the turmoil, people end up being displaced within a country or regionally as well as internationally. With the change in the economic power balance, the economically and politically stronger states began to intervene more in the weaker states. As a result, increasing pressures, economic sanctions, and conflicts have led to immigration from Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Venezuela (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, 2022). Such incidents trigger self-protection reflexes and end up with displacement to escape conflicts, wars, guerilla attacks and to seek for better life conditions with job opportunities (Muggah, 2000). To put it differently, conflict-induced displacement reasons are rooted in concerns for one's life, life of the loved ones with better living conditions and future life quality prospects. As a result of the immigration movements that have been going on for centuries in the world, there have been challenges in the acceptance of definitions related to immigration, whatever the reasons. The reason for this is the differences in the causes of the immigration movements, the direction of the immigration movements and the differences in the situations of the countries responding to the immigration movements. In the next section, this thesis discusses why it is difficult to make common definitions.

2.2. Definitional Challenges

Definitional challenges are partly due to the ongoing debate between different theoretical approaches regarding the dynamics of receiving and sending countries of immigration. The causes and dynamics of immigration are defined in different ways from different perspectives. Given the multidimensionality of the phenomena, the theories concerning immigration inevitably falls into multiple social science disciplines. Immigration has been studied by political scientists, economists, sociologists, historians, anthropologists, among others. Each discipline study immigration movements, motivation of migrants and other relevant processes from different methodological standpoints. Studies drawing on different approaches define the relevant terminology.

On the one hand immigration entails in most cases humanitarian crises, on the other hand it has political and economic implications. Different theories are also stemming

from and informed by wide variety and scope of immigration policies implemented by different institutions under multiple uncertainties entailing the process. Because of these reasons, understanding, explaining and even defining immigration have been challenging efforts.

Perhaps, the challenges begin with the inability to calculate the exact number of displaced people in the world due to size of unregulated immigration. In many parts of the world, there is no reliable statistics keeping the accounts of immigration. The exact number of migrants worldwide is not known, they are just estimations (Castles & Miller, 2008). For instance, according to IOM sources, number of migrants in the world is estimated around 281 million (IOM, 2022). Just as the population size of displaced immigrants in the world cannot be calculated precisely, definitions such as a single and common immigration, immigrant, emigrant, refugee, or asylum seeker are not accepted in the world. On the other hand, different definitions and concepts of immigration, which are discussed in detail in Chapter II, depend on several factors such as geographical, political, and legal parameters. However, the lack of mutually agreed definitions and scope of immigration terminology creates difficulties in understanding international immigration problems as well as providing solutions. The fact that every country does not accept common immigration definitions, causes several challenges in terms of immigrants' integration and challenges on accessing basic rights services in the host countries. The ambiguities regarding these categories creates a gap or vacuum in terms of the rights of these displaced people. Consequently, these challenges affect the living conditions of immigrants.

In a way, the fate of immigrants depends on whether there is a legally accepted definition and status in the host country. A clear definition of the concept of an "immigrant" or "refugee" might guarantee the safety and rights of immigrants and refugees. At the same time, the concepts are often confused and used interchangeably because they are very similar to another. Castles and Miller evaluate the existing theories of immigration under three headings. First, according to economic immigration theory, people search for better conditions and opportunities (Castles & Miller, 2008). This model is inspired by insights mainly from economics. The focus is on the supply-demand ratio, where wages are cheaper in labor-intensive countries and

higher in capital-intensive countries. Because of this wage gap, they migrate from poor countries to other countries for better wages. Second, historical structuralist approach emphasizes economic inequalities, balance of political power, and better living prospects. This model focuses on more structural aspects behind the immigration movements. Castles and Miller call for a more comprehensive and explanatory third model which would aim to explain several factors concerning immigration from interdisciplinary immigration systems.

One of the earlier conceptual frameworks offer an analysis on the push and pull factors in the origin and host countries respectively. Push and pull theory explain immigration as the movement from one place to another for either permanent or semi-permanent status (Lee, 1966). According to this theory, this movement was not defined with restrictions and included both internal and external immigration movements (Lee, 1966). According to this approach, immigration can occur if a pull motivation takes place from the destination point (push). In this study, four factors that shape the immigration movement are identified to explain relationship between pull and push factors: field of origin, the field of destination, intervening difficulties, and personal factors. These factors focus on balance and total sum of the positive (pull) and negative (push) factors of immigration movements. Possible immigration between origin country and destination country takes places due to these four factors. For instance, if origin country has lack of services such as health, education and the like, people tend to migrate towards destinations with more opportunities in terms of these services. On the other hand, according to the same study by Lee, people have immigration tendencies due to personal factors. People may immigrate to the country of destination when they think there may be better opportunities in terms of training and career opportunities for them. Beside these three factors, people might migrate due to intervening difficulties such as unexpected civil war, unexpected occupation, unexpected natural disasters. To sum up, people might show immigration tendencies within the framework of these four factors.

Similarly, another early attempt at explaining immigration focused on decision-making of the migrants in terms of the exit motivations. This theoretical approach aimed to describe immigration by focusing on the reasons why some people migrate

while some do not (Petersen, 1958). This approach also emphasized that no concept of immigration can sufficiently correspond to every person's motivation, every movement, and particular situation. However, this reason-based approach opens a room for different types of immigration to make sense of various immigration movements. First one type of immigration is called "primitive immigration" which focuses on natural disasters, and problems related to nature such as earthquake, flood, drought. Second type refers to whether immigration is an option or obligation: Impelled and forced respectively. If people have choices of either migrate or not it is called impelled immigration. If people do not have any option except migrating it is called forced immigration. The important point here is whether individuals or societies have the chance to use the decision mechanism as a result of social force and coercion. Free immigration type does not involve any force on individuals and societies. In this type of immigration, individuals or societies make the decide on migrating or not with their free will. This type of immigration assumed to consist of small number of people rather than a massive movement. Lastly, mass immigration involves the immigration of large groups as the name suggests. Similarly, Robinson (2003) coins voluntarily and involuntarily movements depending on the reasons of immigration (Robinson, 2003).

The recent theories of immigration focus on the international balance of power and its security implications. Especially after the waves of immigration since the 2000s, there has been an increasing focus on security. It is argued that after the Cold War, immigration emerged as a security problem (Huysmans & Squire, 2018). This security-based approach emphasizes that immigration refers to a movement from global south to north caused by economic issues (Newland, 2011). Although immigration is mainly related to economic development, each country experiences both emigration and immigration. It should be noted that even some of the developed countries experience emigration as well. Although, immigration from global south to north -from developing to developed regions- would be a common phenomenon previously, several studies show that there have been new dynamics in this phenomenon leading to new immigrations routed from south to south, or north to north (Newland, 2011).

The security-based literature on immigration led to a discussion on “Externalization” of immigration. As a term, "externalization" is used to strengthen borders and expand border controls in receiving countries from the Global South to Global North countries (Menjívar, 2014). The US, Europe and other target countries have started to create various immigration agreements to provide externalization and immigration management. For example, Europe engages in strategic negotiations with other countries, especially transit countries, in order to securitize immigration, to secure immigration movements to or to European borders, and to manage immigration (Missbach & Phillips, 2020). In other words, externalization is where activities such as support and impose directly or indirectly for immigration management outside the borders of the target countries. Indirect strategies are generally implemented through transit countries, which are both the solution and the source of the irregular migrant problem. Transit countries are of great importance as they are both a solution and a problem, and the importance of transit countries in immigration management and externalization is explained by Missbach and Phillips, 2020 as follows:

Those unwilling or reluctant gatekeeper transit states must be taken seriously, as business-as-usual immigration directives and programs financed by potential destination countries may no longer be a valid option. This is because more and more transit countries are aware of their bargaining power and are beginning to prioritize their political and economic interests linked to immigration over the interests of other countries. (Missbach & Phillips, 2020, p. 23).

The content of these agreements and cooperation with countries include both reward and punishment combinations related to immigration. As a reward, while some segments, educated segments were encouraged to migrate, on the other hand, they created barriers to immigration for some groups (Menjívar, 2014). In order to realize these securitization strategies, countries cooperate with international institutions, non-governmental organizations and local institutions (Van Dessel, 2021). One of the tools has been using to securitize borders is voluntarily return is related with temporary protection which is also the topic of this thesis. Although there are in-depth studies on voluntary return in Europe, there has not been much work in the literature on voluntary return in the Global South (Missbach & Phillips, 2020; Van Dessel, 2021). The reason why the European example is included as an example in this thesis is that European

states tend to follow more restrictive and comprehensive immigration policies (Missbach & Phillips, 2020).

Another definition of externalization in the literature is externalization is part of the governance of extraterritorial immigration and is the extension of border controls and immigration from Global North receiving countries to Global South sending countries (Stock, Üstübilici, Schultz, 2019). In this way, a cooperative framework is drawn through externalization of immigration management. Externalization is effective in keeping unwanted immigrants away due to the absence of documentation. however, due to the frequent increase in irregular immigration movements, the number of irregular and undocumented immigrants coming to the global south is increasing, although efforts are made to strengthen border controls in cooperation (Spijkerboer, 2018). Externalization is part of the efforts to regulate international immigration control, which is often discussed today. Because these efforts affect both cooperating countries such as Europe and transit countries (Spijkerboer, 2018). The reason for this is that in the global world, immigration, emigration, displacement and transit immigration are interrelated and at the same time interconnected (FitzGerald, Scott, 2019). For example, due to the strengthening of immigration and border controls by the Global South countries, most of the immigrants who want to migrate from the southern countries to the northern countries stayed in transit countries, such as Turkey or Colombia (FitzGerald, Scott, 2020).

2.3 Conceptual Framework of Immigration and Temporary Protection

Examining and identifying the differences between definitions of the terms concerning immigration are important to understand and evaluate the immigration policies of countries, because countries shape their immigration policies according to terminology agreed on the agreements, laws and articles. This part of the thesis focuses on the definition of migrant, refugee, asylum seeker, temporary protection status, transit and destination country. Because these terms are the most relevant definitions used in international agreements, laws and declarations which will be discussed in following chapter. Also, these definitions mentioned because, in the next parts the study explains explain how Turkey and Colombia react immigration from Syria and Venezuela based

on these definitions. How the basic immigration terms are defined included in this thesis because the international agreements created are on a common ground and countries make use of these definitions in their own immigration management.

2.3.1 Immigrant

Although there is no globally agreed migrant definition, the definitions used by several agencies focus on similar features. One commonly used definition of migrant is as follows: “A migrant is a person who moves away from country or crossing international borders and leave his/her residence address either temporary or permanent” (IOM, 2019a, p. 132). The term defined by IOM includes many migrant types such as labor migrants, seasonal migrants, smuggled migrants, vulnerable migrants, irregular and regular migrants. An irregular migrant is a person who does not comply with the international rules of the country he/she entered by crossing the border and does not have the documents required by the authorities. A regular migrant is who cross borders with authorized permissions, legal documents and followed by international rules of the country that they try to cross. Vulnerable migrants are the ones who are at risk of violating and abusing human rights in general, the term migrant describes a person who moves within or between countries to improve their economic and/or social conditions. Definition by IOM is substantial, because IOM has one of the agencies implement extensive duties on immigration related events. On the other hand, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OCHA) made a similar migrant definition. According to OCHA’s definition, migrant is “a person who stays outside of their state of birth” (OCHA, n.d.).

2.3.2 Refugee

Mostly, the definitions of immigrant and refugee are often confused or used interchangeably. However, the definition of refugee is strictly stated in international laws. This is why, this thesis considers the definition used in international laws. According to the international law, in the 1951 Convention with Text of the 1967 Protocol, Article 1, a refugee is defined as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for

reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion“ (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, p. 3). According to the social scientist, the important point of being refugees is cutting ties with their home countries and requesting protection from the host country in which they seek asylum (Rein, 1993). If people across international borders become refugees, if they move within their country of origin, they become displaced people. Even though refugees and migrants share some common movement experiences, their architectural networks differ from each other. Refugees generally use their relationships and network with their friends and relatives who experienced crossing borders and take advantage of the experience of these people. Refugees often need protection, and this need is urgent. There is a relationship between illegal immigration and refugees. Most of the time, people whose asylum applications are not accepted and who cannot obtain refugee status continue to stay in the country illegally (Bratram et al., 2017). When people cannot obtain refugee status, they cannot benefit from many basic services in areas such as health and education because they do not have legal rights. This situation makes immigrants more vulnerable to abuse. The basic rights of those who do not have the appropriate documents and do not have legal status are also open to exploitation.

2.3.3 Asylum Seeker

The definition of asylum seeker is highly significant, because this term is linked with refugee definitions. Asylum seeker is “the one who seeks to get international protection based on positive legal rights” (IOM, 2019a, p. 14). In this definition, the critical point is getting international protection. Because when people escape from violence, political pressure, and conflict like refugees do, it is necessary to provide international protection. However, there is a clear difference between an asylum seeker and a refugee. Asylum seeker status means that a person whose asylum application has not yet been accepted in the country of destination. Every refugee once was an asylum seeker but not every asylum recognized as a refugee until application accepted. As asylum seekers might face the same problems and threats if they return to their country, they seek to stay in the country they move (Bratram et al., 2017). Once their application approved, asylum seekers receive refugee status.

2.3.4. Country of Destination and Country of Transit

Since the world has been experiencing one of the biggest immigration waves all over the world, definition of transit and destination country became one of the main topics of immigration related discussions. According to IOM definition, country of destination is the host country that is the destination for regular and irregular migrants (IOM, 2009). The term country of transit defined by IOM as the country through which immigrants pass through to go to the destination country. Migrants start their movements from the source country and pass the transit country to reach the final destination. Typically, the transit country is the nearest country to the source country or country of destination. As the theory of externalization note, the transit countries may in time become the destination country as in the cases of Turkey and Colombia. It means, with the changing principle of global immigration management the positions and therefore policies of countries can change along with the changing dynamics.

2.3.5. Temporary Protection

Temporary protection status was created to launch urgent actions for urgent events and impacts and contents of the temporary protection might change from state to state. However, implementation of temporary protection status can be traced back to World War II. After the Second World War, an international regulation for the protection of refugees was much required, as many people specially from the Eastern Europe countries had to migrate arguably due to conflicts, political pressures and lack of sources. To deal with the humanitarian crisis, the United Nations established the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in 1950 and its activities were launched in January 1951. After establishing a refugee council, 1951 Geneva Convention came into force and definition of the refugee was formulated. With this convention, the concept of an internationally recognized refugee emerged for the first time and the international protection regime was established. Consequently, temporary protection is shaped in this historical context from this historical moment. However, neither a clear definition of temporary protection nor the requirement or conditions of this protection were clearly fixed in international law.

IOM, later on, offered a definition that is generally agreed on. According to this definition, “regulation developed by states to provide temporary protection to people fleeing from environments of conflict or widespread violence, without prior individual status determination” (IOM, 2009, p. 33). Since temporary protection is related with massive immigration influx, the definition needs to be explained. Massive influx; It is generally to collectively seek asylum in neighboring states with mass asylum demands due to reasons such as occupation, civil war, oppressive and authoritarian governments, and human rights violations (Uzun, 2012). Asylum generally emerges as an act of fleeing from the country of origin due to violations of basic human rights and being in danger of life, and the provision of needed rights by other states (Öztürk, 2012). Seen from the states' point of view, asylum: it is the discretion of states to grant asylum to foreigners or not (Sopf, 2001).

However, the right to asylum is not mentioned in the Geneva Convention. Therefore, there is a relationship between temporary protection status and asylum seekers, and the relationship between them is related to who will benefit from this protection. Three main items need to be revealed in the discussions and practices of temporary protection: 1. The reasons and numbers of people who will benefit from temporary protection 2. The duration of the temporary protection status and what happens when it is terminated 3. The standards of the practices and services to be provided with the temporary protection status (Fitzpatrick 1995; Fitzpatrick 2000; Akram-Rempel, 2004). Temporary protection within the framework of these articles; It can be explained by explaining who will benefit from temporary protection, the number of people who will be injured, the duration of temporary protection and how voluntary return will be when it ends, and what the rights and services to be provided with temporary protection are.

Although temporary protection can be explained and discussed within the framework of these articles, there is still no single accepted definition of temporary protection in international documents. However, as defined in this study and in Fitzpatrick's studies, temporary protection can be defined as an emergency response applied in case of mass flow. As defined in the Geneva Convention, the people involved in the mass influx are both those who are included in the definition of refugee defined in the convention and

those who have to seek asylum due to hot conflict, serious disruptions in public order, and being under occupation in the country they live in. Temporary Protection is a mechanism used to separate asylum seekers and mass migrant people by including wider mass movements, as it includes refugees not included in the Geneva Convention (Edwards, 2012).

The importance of this temporary protection mechanism started with the crises in the 1990s (Fitzpatrick, 2000). The war in the Former Yugoslavia between 1991-1995 After World War II, it led to an unprecedented refugee crisis. After the Yugoslav Crisis, the Kosovo Crisis also shows that the Geneva Convention is insufficient to deal with Europe's refugee crisis (Sopf, 2001). Because the new style II. They migrated with different motivations from the refugees formed after the World War II and the political refugees after the war. At this point, Europe realized that the Geneva Convention would not be sufficient for these crises and that a new protection system was needed (Sopf, 2001).

As a result, UNHCR offered temporary protection to intervene in the crisis in former Yugoslavia, which was trying to escape ethnic genocide and armed conflict (Sopf, 2001). In order for the temporary protection mechanism to be implemented in the same way by the European states, the representatives of the states related to immigration gathered in London and as a result of this meeting: It was decided that it would be appropriate for the people who were displaced due to the crisis and conflict in the former Yugoslavia to be accommodated in their countries by the European states. The explanation of the temporary protection status proposed by UNHCR was made by Sopf as follows: Temporary protection status is taken under protection by other states until these reasons are eliminated, and when this situation disappears, the return is provided as an alternative instead of the states granting status beyond their capacity. It is an application (Sopf, 2001). In this way, states avoided statuses that would exceed their capacities, and until the crisis was resolved, temporary status was provided to IDPs that would create a suitable environment for them to live within the framework of human rights. However, the mechanism needed to be clarified, and for this, decisions were taken by the European Council in 1993 on who will be granted temporary protection (Sopf, 2001; Hailbronner, 1994). In the basic framework, the temporary

protection status will be given to those who fled Yugoslavia, with five articles (Hailbronner, 1994). According to this:

1. Persons whose life is in direct danger
2. Persons imprisoned or held in camps because of war,
3. Persons who have a serious illness or have been seriously injured,
4. Persons who cannot access medical intervention and health services within their own means and resources,
5. It has been decided that persons who have been sexually assaulted and who cannot be protected due to insufficient local resources as a result are eligible to be evaluated within the scope of temporary protection status and deemed appropriate to be protected by European states.

The importance of this framework, which was determined by the European Council in 1993, is that it causes European states to form a common policy on who will be granted temporary protection status from now on (Sopf, 2001).

After joint decisions, approximately 700000 people obtained the right of asylum in European states within the scope of temporary protection status without being included in the definition of refugee in the Geneva Convention, without receiving refugee status (Sopf, 2001). After the provision of temporary protection, the emphasis was placed on transitivity and it was decided by most of the European states to send these people back to their countries when the situations causing the crisis disappeared (Sopf, 2001).

Beside former Yugoslavian example, one of the other examples occurred in background of the temporary protection includes policy interventions have made in between 1999 and 2005 by Germany, Denmark, Australia. These three countries introduced temporary protection to Convention refugees. Policy started with Australia in 1999 by implementing three-year temporary protection visas (TPV) to asylum seekers who do not have valid visa or passport. This policy continued with Germany and Denmark between 2002 and 2005 by providing temporary protection status to all kind of refugees up to seven years (Mansouri et al., 2009). Policy of the TPV was a strategy to control and strengthen border from irregular and uncontrolled asylum seekers. On the other hand, other EU states like Spain and Netherlands have specific

legal foundation (Joly, 1998). During these crises, European countries followed their own procedures. Since they accept these people according to their own legislation, the practices of the countries in the temporary protection process have differed (Koser & Black, 1999). Although there were various differences in the implementation stages, the temporary protection legislation implemented by the countries had a common aspect. This is: they have agreed on a limited period of protection that all people will be sent to their country of origin as soon as conditions are met (Sopf, 2001).

While some countries have implemented ad hoc (temporary) based new concepts by using their existing laws, some states have developed laws specific to temporary protection for mass immigration situations. Therefore, the rights given to persons under temporary protection differ in temporary protection practices (Kerber, 2000). It is very important whether the principle of temporary protection covers the principle of non-refoulement when evaluating other crises, such as the mass immigration crisis in Venezuela and Syria, which is currently being experienced in the world. The principle of non-refoulement covers the application of temporary protection until the situation causing mass immigration in the country of origin disappears (Sopf, 2001). Therefore, this principle can be considered as an obligation that leads states to apply temporary protection even today.

However, if the crisis continues, asylum seekers are allowed not to be sent back until the crisis continues, with the principle of non-refoulement. From this point of view, the principle of non-refoulement can be considered as a burden for countries. The potential burden of the non-refoulement principle was also mentioned in the preparation stages of the Geneva Convention (Hathaway, 2005). However, these views remained only as views and were not implemented. Apart from the Geneva Convention to which Turkey and Colombia are a party, the Cartagena Declaration, to which Colombia is also a party, which will be explained in the following sections, the views of UNHCR and the EU Temporary Protection Directive described above have common views on the need to apply the principle of non-refoulement (Fitzpatrick, 2000). Compliance with the principle of non-refoulement is not at the discretion of the countries, on the contrary, it is a responsibility they are obliged to comply with due to the international agreements they are party to. Another right beside non-refoulement,

temporary protection status provides some rights to people who seek asylum but those have not yet received any refugee status. Some scholars explain this temporary solution as a way to ignore and escape from the burden of refugees (Fitzpatrick, 2000). However, there is no clear temporary status description on international declarations or agreements (Joly, 1998). UNHCR published a report including definitions of temporary protection status and its components (Fitzpatrick, 2000). According to that report, the first principle is non-refoulement (Fitzpatrick, 2000).

As a result, temporary protection basically established for Europe to give quick responses to crisis and refugees who do not fulfill Geneva Convention criteria (Joly, 1998). During the Yugoslavian refugee crisis, the EU states used the temporary protection status as a tool for decreasing the burden of refugees (Joly, 1998). The EU states had to give an answer to accept asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia, because of the neighboring geographical position. Temporary protection can be considered as a rapid response plan of countries in an emergency (Mansouri et al., 2009). Another discussion says that temporary protection is a building block for countries to create a new pathway for asylum policies (Joly, 1998). This situation is observed especially in the TPV, which started in the examples of Germany, Austria and Denmark and started to be implemented in European countries with the Syrian Crisis. When we look at the current situation examples from all over the world, especially from Turkey and Colombia shows that temporary protection policy is the integral and key component of the asylum regimes of the countries. There was no other option but accepting people escaping former Yugoslavia. This situation repeated itself in a different time and place in Turkey and Colombia. Turkey and Colombia had to accept people who migrated from Syria and Venezuela respectively and provided them with temporary protection as tried 20 years ago in the EU states with the former Yugoslavians. With the Yugoslavia crisis, European states realized that the Geneva Convention was not functional in cases of mass flow and tried to create a new mechanism (Sopf, 2001). As a result of these efforts, a similar temporary protection mechanism was established, which is still applied by Colombia and Turkey today.

CHAPTER 3

THE IMMIGRATION POLICIES OF LATIN AMERICA

This section focuses on Latin American immigration policies, because from the independence wars since the 18th century, Latin American governments have been trying to adopt common or coordinated policies in domestic economy, regional trade and integration as a region. This common policy framework has had impacts on immigration policies and implementation. For this reason, Colombian policy cannot be analyzed without looking at Latin American immigration policies at large. In order to understand immigration policy, this study looks at the common economic agreements created to act jointly in Latin America, The Cartagena Declaration, The Quito Declaration, which is applied to create a common immigration policy. After looking at the common ground of agreement in Latin America, this thesis focuses on Colombia's immigration history, the problems in Colombia, immigration from Colombia to Venezuela.

3.1. The Latin American Immigration Policy

The immigration policy of Latin America has shaped by the results of Cold War, increase in population, demand to cheap labor (Durand, 2009). After Cold War, industrialization period has gained momentum. As a result of industrialization, demand to labor especially cheap labor significantly has increased. To fill this gap people from Latin America started to emigrate to other countries. At the same time, some countries from Latin America have become both emigration and transit country, because people from Latin America used some countries as pathway to reach the US

borders. Mostly majority of the countries in the region had the same experiences at the same time. For this reason, creating a common immigration policy among all Latin America and Caribbean became essential. The situation in Colombia has affected by this aim to create common immigration policy. After the arrival of Venezuelans, Colombia's immigration policy was shaped within the regionally agreed terms and concepts of immigration management. To actualize this common acting aim, firstly, attempts of creating common economic agreements started. Common Market for Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) is an example of common acting agreements between countries in the region (Kaltenthaler & Mora, 2002). The reason for establishing MERCOSUR is that some economic integration mechanisms have failed in the past. For instance, Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was established in 1960 for regional integration, and the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI/LAIA) was established in the same year have failed and expected results in integration did not carry out. In theory, they are both efficient, but in reality, actions are failed for negotiations and cooperation between the countries in the region. After some inefficient attempts at integration, MERCOSUR becomes quite successful, and this cooperation can compare to European Union as an international integration example (Kaltenthaler & Mora, 2010).

Apart from joint integration initiatives, the region has also been trying to adopt a common immigration policy based on common agreements that I discussed above. As The United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees also known as 1951 Geneva Convention was adopted by fifteen countries in Latin America. Colombia and Venezuela are two of these fifteen countries. However, the region wanted to create their own immigration policy and immigration response mechanism. To achieve this aim, a few agreements and regulations have been made such as Cartagena Declaration and Quito Declaration were created for identifying refugee status, refugee rights and legislation.

3.1.1 The Cartagena Declaration

The Cartagena Declaration has an essential place in creating and adopting a common immigration policy in Latin America. The idea of creating this Declaration emerged as a result of the internal conflict that took place in the region. After civil wars in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, people from these countries started to move to other safer countries to escape violence in their countries. The exit point of Cartagena came from crises started in 1970 and caused displacement in 1980 in Latin America. Over two million people from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador were displaced within their countries or to other countries. 200 thousand were recognized as refugees and received refugee status (UNHCRa, n.d.). At that time, there were not enough resources in the region, and sources were insufficient to deal with this displacement situation. The legal structure was built with the declaration to solve these problems. After these movements, the declaration was established in 1984 to deal with massive displacement in Latin America and provide protection to displaced people. It is the most crucial document for refugee definition and protection in Latin America. The declaration was established based on the principles of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol and supported by multiple international organizations like UNHCR and the Organization of American States (OAS) (Ibid).

In Latin America, most countries are part of the declaration even though they do not adopt the 1951 Geneva Convention. The region tried to establish their own regulations and policies based on Cartagena Declaration and to support the declaration's aim conferences were held with the participation of most of the states in the region, and at the same time, the immigration policy of the region began to take shape, taking into account the existing international law. In 1989, the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) emerged with the leadership of six countries: Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala. These six-country tried to draw solution maps for displacement, social conflict, economics, and poverty. CIREFCA and the Cartagena Declaration have a significant and evolutionary definition for adopting a common international immigration policy among Latin American countries. Apart from the CIREFCA, The Cartagena Declaration contains

seventeen discussion meetings that suggest solutions to the refugee crisis and better refugee protection. These conclusions overall contain three main points. Firstly, adopting human rights for the protection of refugees. Secondly, disseminate a humanitarian approach and space. Lastly, constantly working to determine the region's needs for refugee protection. The decision of several meetings to discuss the needs of the region was held. The first one held in 1994, the second meeting held in 2004 and the last was held in 2014. These meetings were plans to make follow-ups and future action points on the refugee situation. During these meetings, two main points were focused which are durable solutions and protection (Jubilut et al., 2017). The comprehensiveness and inclusiveness of both Cartagena and CIREFCA created a significant immigration policy for the region.

It is important that the conferences were held after the declaration, as it emphasizes the issues mentioned in the declaration again. Particular attention should be paid to four valuable points that declaration emphasizes (Esthimer, 2016). Firstly, the definition and the concept of refugee is very wide. It includes general violence, internal conflicts, foreign aggression, and human rights violation. Secondly, the definition provides guarantee to protect human rights, refugee and migrant rights and implement humanitarian law. Thirdly, the agreement has created a place to implement refugee rights and integration from the beginning of their entrance. Last but not least, the agreement is very valuable for regional cooperation and regional support for protecting human rights in the region. As the above four points might be understood, the agreement mainly focuses on human rights and implementing these rights for refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers in the region. They developed a coordinated regional protection system focusing on humanitarian services, including legal services for people who are affected by displacement. These four points are really important and share common points with international the 1951 Refugee Convention. Although there are similar points, there is also significantly different points when clarifying definition of refugees. The Cartagena Declaration has three criteria for the definition of refugee (UNHCR, 2013). The first criterion is that the person should be out of his/her country. Secondly, the country which is questioning should be affected by at least one situation. Thirdly, because of these situations' security, freedom, and rights of the person should

be threatened. If the reason behind the definition of Refugee and a common definition is determined, the ground is prepared for a joint response to refugee crises.

The effort to create a common immigration policy started to come to the fore after Venezuela's situation. Although it became part of the Cartagena Declaration to Colombia in 2009, Venezuela refuses to participate in this formation (Freier et al., 2020). For this reason, attempts are being made to create different immigration policies to solve the current crisis in the region. One of them is The Quito Declaration.

3.1.2 The Quito Declaration

In 2018, to provide communication and coordination between countries for upcoming immigration and refugee flow from Venezuela Quito Declaration was established (IOM, n.d.). This declaration is valid for Latin America and the Caribbean district with the leadership of thirteen countries: Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The main aim of this gathering is to strengthen financial and institutional cooperation between member states most affected by immigration flow. The government of Venezuela was also invited to this meeting to cooperate with other states and find a solution to Venezuelan crisis. However, the government at that time did not accept the invitation. They showed that they are against cooperation with other states for the Venezuelan refugee and migrant problem. After the first meeting, the second and third meetings were held, and members agreed on three initial action plans (Process de Quito, n.d.). Firstly, the countries agreed on legal immigration status and established technological platforms to share standard information about Venezuelan migrants in the region. Secondly, shared economic and social responsibilities for integration. Lastly, establishing achievable action points for regional solutions protects vulnerable groups like children and single women and avoids xenophobia against refugee and migrant communities. After the third chapter, the fourth chapter was discussed recently in 2019. It is an essential chapter because this chapter includes international partners like European Union, UNICEF, the US, and Canada for the regional Refugee and Immigrations Response Plan (PRRMV). The fifth and sixth chapters also focused on the same topics more comprehensively. The last and sixth meeting was held during the COVID-19 period in 2020, with members more focused on child and youth protection, family

reunification, and voluntarily returning to Venezuela. However, due to the pandemic, the aims are not followed in detail. In terms of establishing a common immigration policy in the region, the Quito Meetings are important in that they include 13 important states of the region and try to include Venezuela, which is the source of the problem. In order to create this structure, a conference was held with the participation of most of the states in the region, and at the same time, the immigration policy of the region began to take shape, taking into account the existing international law. Understanding why Venezuela did not respond to the call to attend these meetings is important to understand how the immigration process is progressing. It is equally important to understand the historical background and immigration process of Colombia, which is home to the largest number of Venezuelans in the world. Historically, these two countries have been in constant relationship and interaction. For this reason, this study examines this situation in the next section. Understanding the events that Colombia has experienced in the past and the historical background of Colombia is important to understand the temporary protection policy discussed in this thesis. Because this policy reveals the immigration policy that Colombia has created by bringing together both its own dynamics and the common immigration policy steps taken in Latin America.

3.2. Immigration in Colombia

Colombia is constituted of 32 regions and a unitary and decentralized state. The country's official language is Spanish and is governed by a federal presidential system. The majority of ethnic groups are mestizo, indigenous, white, and black. The country is located in west of Venezuela. This explains why hosts the largest number of Venezuelans in Latin America, because it is the most accessible place location. Therefore, this thesis includes basic information about Colombia because the Venezuelan immigration movement affected its history, culture, economy, and social life.

3.2.1 Background of Immigration in Colombia

Firstly, the historical background of immigration policy in Colombia lays down to after the colonization period. Independence movement of Latin America in 19th century brought immigration movements from European territory. The aim of this act is to fill the labor market gap, learn new production methods and modernize them, and improve the race (Mojica, 2015). However, from the 19th to the 20th century, just small migrant groups came to Colombia and achievement was not reached. Later, immigration effort completed by people who came from Syria, Palestine, and Japan (Mojica, 2015). Later in the 20th century, immigration flow followed by Jewish, Italian, Polish, and Spanish people who settled mostly in Cali and Bogota. These people migrated mainly to Colombia to escape their oppressive and fascist regimes. While people were migrating to Colombia, the country started to experience internal conflict. In 1953, the military took over the government's control under Rojas Pinilla's leadership. The coup was that conservatives did not accept the success of liberals who advocated modernization (Arslan, 2015). The main goal of this new military intervention was to prevent the conflict between liberals and conservatives. Conflict between two groups brought financial and currency crises to the country (Hobsbawm, 1995). Immediately society began to react, and social movements started. People formed armed defense forces against the regime (Arslan, 2015). as a result of the reactions, the church stopped supporting Roja regime, and the regime fell in 1957. During this period, the civil war ended. Nevertheless, this period continues to be called the history de “la violencia” period (the period of violence) (Hobsbawm, 1995, p. 251). There are some reasons underlying the conflict period and causing this conflict. At the same time, conflicts in Colombian history are also related to Colombia's experience of emigration and immigration.

3.2.2 Conflicts in Colombia

Since Colombia is not a highly developed country, the economic reasons underlying the conflicts play an important role. Even today, the country continues to experience economic problems. For instance, since 2014 annual GDP growth of Colombia has been decreasing, and since 2018 the country has been experiencing the sharpest decline

in GDP growth. Between 2018 and 2020, annual GDP growth has fallen by almost seven percent (World Bank, 2022). One of the biggest reasons for the economic problems in the country was the decrease in cocaine supply. Producing and supplying cocaine played a significant role in the country's history and economics. All over the world, Colombia was the largest cocaine with supplying 80% of cocaine in the world (Saab & Taylor, 2009). It is widespread to share the income from the cocaine market by government officials and illegal armed groups in Colombia. In Colombia, many non-governmental armed groups like *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) and *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - FARC) earn income from illegal activities such as drug market, human trafficking, bank robberies, and homicides. However, FARC differs from others because its primary goal was enhancing its relationship with other international drug market owners and expand its illegal drug trafficking activities to other countries (Saab & Taylor, 2009). The historical background of FARC dates to 1964. In 1964, guerillas started their activities in the country. Civil people in rural areas were the main victims of FARC. However, its violent activities often targeted the Colombian military with its huge number of combats. By 2001, members of FARC reached between 16 thousand and 18 thousand combats. However, in 2008 members of FARC combats decreased to nine thousand with the effort policy of combating armed organizations of the Colombian government.

Violence in Colombia had an impact on internal displacement and emigration and cost economic and political instability, social inequality, orphaning thousands of children, product reduction, low income, increased drug trafficking, and unjust enrichment in some regions. From 1973 to 1983, immigration from Colombia to Venezuela continued. At that time, position of Venezuela was much better than Colombia, especially with economic and democratic stability thanks to oil and steel income (Cárdenas & Mejía, 2006). Venezuela has become a country with full of opportunities for Colombians with lower education levels and labor. As a result of these events, internal displacement and emigration started. The historical immigration background between Colombia and Venezuela has mutual two-direction-emigration from Colombia can be divided into three parts (Mojica, 2015). The first phase happened between 1965 and 1975. Poor and uneducated Colombians migrated to neighboring

countries for job opportunities. The second part was also related to economic concerns after the oil boom in Venezuela. In 1980s people from Colombia started to migrate to Venezuela to take advantage of job opportunities created by the oil boom. The last and third part of emigration took place between 1995 and 2000. The main motivations were not different from the other two but included safety reasons. From 1990 to 1995, there was drug-induced economic growth in Colombia. However, an unexpected economic collapse in 1995 occurred due to the pursuit of neoliberal policies (Guarnizo & Diaz, 2011). The effects of neoliberal policies, including a fully internationalized market, and privatization of public institutions and goods, have adversely affected the country's economy. Due to these events, Colombian people migrated neighborhood country Venezuela.

Besides conflicts, 85% of Colombians left their country with economic concerns (Mojica, 2015). FARC, ELN, and EPL non-state actors had roles during emigration. According to UNHCR, more than 50 years of armed conflict caused 6.3 million displacements within Colombia, and over 360 thousand Colombian migrated to neighboring countries (UNHCR 2015) was essential as a breaking point for the conflicts between the Colombian state and armed non-government organizations. After this new context, Venezuela has deported Colombians. As a result of the problems and conflicts in Colombia, thousands of Colombians immigrated to Venezuela. But unlike Colombia today, Venezuela did not show the reaction Colombia did today and did not embrace Colombians. To understand why and how Venezuela is in this situation, it is necessary to look at the country's historical background.

3.3. The Immigration Urgency: The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela constitutes of thirty-three states, and it is a federal state located in North America with 916.445 square kilometers. Its population is almost 29 million. Venezuela shares border with Brazil, Guyana and Colombia. The country was a colonial state occupied by Spain since 1522 and lived as a Spanish colony until earning its sovereignty in the 1800s. After having full sovereignty, various policies for development began to be implemented. Some of these policies have succeeded, while others have failed. Venezuela started transforming with oil detection

in the country in the 1900s. However, the country's rich oil resources were the most significant factor that determined the fate of the country. The main income source of the country became oil. Until the 1960s, Venezuela was the world's largest primary oil-producing country, losing its place to Saudi Arabia in 1970, falling to the second position (Venezuelan & Ausman James, 2019). Between 1950 and 1960 Venezuela's economic prosperity was very developed and it was among the richest countries in the world. The state offered many job opportunities to its citizens, provided basic services, and all kinds of services. After 1980, the country's democratic, economic, and social problems started, and since 1990 has been becoming worse.

The country has experienced political developments that would affect the economy. A barrel lost 80% of its value, and Venezuela was not expecting this depreciation (Venezuelan & Ausman James, 2019). The main export product in Venezuela was. In 2015, a significant decline in oil reserves fell by a third (Gedan, 2017). Even if the country has massive and unique sources, there is no social, political or economic stability to benefit from. Although oil prices and the economy were severely affected, Chavez's position did not change and even strengthened. In 2013, was the year of the golden age of Chavez. Venezuela increased to 67th out of 187 states on the human development index (Venezuelan & Ausman James, 2019). Suddenly Venezuela became a country that helps and supports other left-winning parties in Latin America to empower their status and create a union equal to the US. Venezuela, which supports right-wing parties, became a socialist country in 2007. Venezuelan government has started to buy privatized service companies such as the country's National Telephone Company (CANTV) and national bank Banco de Venezuela (Venezuelan & Ausman James, 2019). Between 2005 and 2017 state nationalized one thousand companies. This act brought both positive and negative effects on the country. As a negative effect, companies became state-dependent and had to share their profits with the state. The country had problems with production since oil prices have increased. From 2007 to 2017, there was a million-ton decrease in corn and rice production in the country (Gedan, 2017). Considering Venezuela's culinary culture, this great decline in rice and corn is very important. This is followed by food scarcity and malnutrition. As an example, social life, economic freedom, income inequality, women and children rights, human rights, and access to food. Ten million Venezuelan eat two or less than

two meals a day measured by the study in 2017. Almost three thousand children experience food malnutrition (Cuevas, 2020). Approximately one Venezuelan has reduced ten kilograms in a year. While there were problems in production, problems arose in other areas such as the medical system.

The reason behind lack of accessing to medical treatment, food and other imports is related with dynamics between the US and Latin American countries. many concepts cause relationship and discussion between these two. Venezuela, where the concept of democracy is discussed in many ways, has similar denominators in terms of regime just like Cuba in the west. They are among the countries sanctioned by the US because they have similar denominators. Therefore, when we look at the reasons for the emergence of the current immigration movement, the existence and severity of US sanctions is an important milestone. In 2018, the United States announced that various sanctions would be imposed on Maduro, mentioning that the Venezuelan elections were "so-called" dubious (Camacho, 2018). The justification for the sanctions is the protests initiated by the opposition of the government in Venezuela in 2014 and 2017 and the presidential elections in 2018. These sanctions include visa cancellation, travel ban, freezing of bank accounts and property, and arms embargoes (Vidal & Mazalli, 2019). On the other hand, sanctions were decided on oil, the main source of Venezuela's economy, and steps were taken to freeze the stock market shares of Venezuela's national oil company Petroleos De Venezuela SA and to stop imports. The sanctions, which started with the 2018 presidential elections and are increasing in severity, continue during Maduro's presidency. Because, in this controversial process, the US recognized Guaidó 's presidency and evaluated Maduro's actions as contrary to democracy. That is the reason why the American Congress has officially declared to support Guaidó 's presidency and not recognize Maduro's legitimacy (Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, 2020). At the same time, it was announced by the US officials that the US Maduro administration increased the poverty of the country and was responsible for the economic problems, and therefore sanctions were imposed on the Maduro administration and individuals close to the administration (Staff, 2019). As a result of the sanctions imposed, a large amount of food and medicine was imported in the country, resulting in a shortage of food and medicine. In a report

prepared by US economists, death rates in Venezuela increased by 30% as a result of indirect sanctions due to insufficient medicine (Seattle, 2019).

The May 20, 2018 national elections caused a major tension in the country as well as internationally along the geopolitical lines. While Juan Guaidó was recognized as legitimate president by about 60 countries; Nicolas Maduro's rule was recognized by about other 20 countries. More concretely, while the US and the Western countries supported Guaidó, Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Turkey among others expressed their support for Maduro. (Bronner, 2019). Such political turmoil, has had direct economic implications as US began to expand the embargo on Venezuela. The sanctions imposed have seriously affected social life. Access to basic needs has become more difficult as basic needs are met through imports. Especially the sanctions applied in the field of food and medicine have affected the quality of life of Venezuelans. As a result of insufficient resources in the country, the tendency to migrate has increased. Because of these problems, Venezuela has the highest number of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. One in five applicants of all applicants from Venezuela (Gedan, 2017). Venezuela is experiencing, people in the country have started to migrate both within the country and internationally in order to lead a better life.

3.3.1 Emigration from Venezuela

As discussed from previous chapters, there was always strong interaction between Colombia and Venezuela. At the same time, there has been always an important and ongoing flow between Colombia and Venezuela. Colombia hosts a large number of migrants with no specific. The main entry point to Colombia is Peru. Historically immigration movement from Venezuela can be divided into three different time periods (Testa, 2019). The first immigration flow occurred between 2005 and 2006, the second flow between 2016 and 2017, and the third and the last one started in 2018. Before the displacement numbers reached over five million, most the international institutions described the first two flows as a immigration movement. In the first phase, people with high education levels, business people, and professions started to migrate because of political and economic concerns. They left their countries before situations

become more serious. People who moved to the host country found a good job very soon or arranged their job before arriving at the host country. The second phase started in late 2016 and early 2017. This time people from the middle class began to migrate to other countries. They are the people who have degrees, and university education and mainly consisted of young people. They also left their countries after having concerns about the political and economic situation in the country. Human activists, political leaders, and people against Maduro and his regime left their countries and requested asylum status from host countries. In 2018 after the Venezuelan economy completely collapsed, the last period started. In this phase, people from the lower economic class migrated due to economic problems and instability. The profile of migrants of this phase was non-educated people with no professional skills. The shape of the first two phases is better than the last phase, and they had the financial and other support to leave their countries at the beginning of the crisis. The first two phases can accept as a immigration movement. However, in the last phase profile of people who had to leave their countries is very low. They face more severe problems and meet many dangerous patterns during reaching host countries. Because of these problems they faced, these movement type and their status can accept as refugee status. Also, during their movement, borders were closed to prevent their movement. On the other hand, their integration process is more complex than the first two-phase. People from the first two-phase are mostly educated, technical, and financially more sustainable people. However, people were low educated, poor, and more prone to damage in the first phase. After reaching five million displaced people, in three phases refugee topic started to talk more among institutions and states.

Now more than five million people had to leave their country. Because of economic and political crises in Venezuela (Chaves-González & Echeverría-Estrada, 2020). 40% of Venezuelans confirmed that they migrated voluntarily, and 70 % claimed that they had to leave their country because of political issues (Cuevas, 2020, p. 257 as cited in Consultores 2018). The main reasons Venezuela gives so much immigration are economic and political problems. However, other reasons fall outside of these and are effective. According to this comprehensive study 77% of Venezuelans have an idea to return to their county. 24% of migrants answer responded as moving to another country from Colombia. Another finding is related with staying or leaving the country.

Migrants must earn money to sustain their lives. Also, they are dependent on other people in Venezuela. In Colombia, 80% of migrants send cash with mostly using informal transfer methods to their families, friends, etc., in their home country. This is a very high percentage when compared to other countries. It is as important to look at the types of immigration as it is to look at why people migrate and their willingness to return.

There are regular and irregular types of immigration from Venezuela to Colombia. Firstly, regular migrants are who cross border with given authority by authorized districts. The second one is irregular immigration. These are coming to Colombia to go another country or point. In that type of Colombia is a transit country where they stop in the country as a beginning of their immigration journey. Most migrants enter Colombia to transit to other states like Ecuador, Chile, and Argentina. Also, there are many not authorized points, and these points include many dangerous possibilities for migrants who want to cross the border. These points include human trafficking, kidnapping, drug trafficking and many other risky conditions. Usually, these points are the points that do not control and provide security by states. Also, in these points, drug cartels and illegal armed groups have control. Many of the migrants reach these points by foot. So, it is a long and exhausting way for migrants to reach their goals. Others also use their passport to transit to other countries (ILO, 2021). There are some main entrance points and these are mapped. In Colombia, official information about immigration is provided by the state authority Immigration Colombia (Migración Colombia). There are seven official entering districts between Venezuela and Colombia. Three of them are in Norte de Santander, other points Arauca, Vichada, Guainia, La Guajira and Vichada have one entering point (Cuevas, 2020).

The entry points of Venezuelans can be determined, but it is more difficult to determine their status after entering the country. Identifying which locations or cities migrants locate and live is impossible to search because Immigration Colombia does not share this significant information with the public. However, some predictions about this data can be predicted thanks to some researchers. For instance, 23.5% of them locate in Bogota, La Guajira and Norte de Sander each host almost 12%. These three cities host almost half of Venezuelan migrants (Cuevas, 2020). We can make

predictions about how these people entered the country and where they live, but what are the factors that push these people to migrate?

3.3.2 Push Factors of Emigration from Venezuela to Colombia

At the beginning of the 20th century, Venezuela was considered as poor and economically underdeveloped. However, this picture changed with the start of oil exploration in the 1920s, when Venezuela turned into a country of migrant receiving country in two well-defined stages (Alvarez,2007 cited in Mazuera-Arias et al., 2020b). Between 1930 and 1963, the first one had specific immigration targets and was strengthened by the creation of a migratory policy with immigration resolutions, decrees, and laws that mainly benefited Europeans, Lebanese, Syrians, and Jews. The second stage was due to economic and political reasons and the need for qualified labor immigration and return immigration. In this stage, the amount of South American migrants, mainly Colombians that were geographically closer to Venezuela, increased because of work opportunities and the possibility of increasing income. While Venezuela was a immigration receiving country, it became a country of emigration due to the political and economic problems that the country started to experience.

Like other countries of the region, Venezuela has experienced political instability. But the coming to power of Hugo Chávez and Nicolas Maduro took political impotence to another dimension and would change the country's fate. As a result of these two regimes, two million people to leave. They began to immigrate to Colombia, Latin American countries, the US, and Spain. The approaches of both regimes were similar. The term of Chávez ended in 2013 with his death. However, his policies continued when Maduro and his political party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), were elected. The mismanagement of the country continued during the Maduro period. Under the authoritarian Maduro regime conditions that were already critical kept getting worse and worse. Maduro's regime and the people supporting Maduro spread all over the country. People close to Maduro began to take part in meed, such as drug dealing and bribery. Those who tried to oppose the regime and the administration began to be silenced and put under political pressure. In 2021, the Maduro government arrested 251 people and declared them political prisoners (Seelke, 2020).

Investigations were opened by the International criminal court to investigate these arrestments to clarify humanitarian crimes. Social problems and protests began to increase during the Maduro period, and people started to protest in the streets of Venezuela. Rumors began to rise that he was cheating as he narrowly beat his opponent on his way to the presidency. This triggered social problems and protests. Student movements were added to the increasing protests, and the Maduro government preferred to use disproportionate violence to suppress those who took to the streets to protest. Forty-three people were killed in one anti-government demonstration (Venezuela Petrol Lanetinden mi Muzdarip, 2017). In 2017, people went to the streets to protest the economic crisis, poverty, hunger, and other problems. During these protests, violent suppression, including soldiers, was used by Maduro government. Over 12 thousand protests were reported, with around 35 demonstrations per day during the first two months of 2018 (Observatorio, 2019). These protests were related to economic, social, and political problems in the country. Nearly fifty thousand anti-government protests were reported between 2013 and 2018. The issues people protest the most: access to essential services, health, nutrition, job opportunities, and political participation. The same report reported that thirteen people were killed in protests only in 2018. Also, many crimes were not reported due to distrust of the judicial system. Other problems in Venezuela are strongly connected to political issues and situations. Justice system has many blanks and issues for adopting the legal system. The report by Violence Venezuelan Observatory in 2018, 64% of all crimes have not reported due to distrust of the justice system (Cuevas, 2020). Illegal groups has become common and has increased their violence in the streets.

In 2019, opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared himself acting president on the grounds that the presidential seat was vacant (Standley et al., 2020). This was legal under Venezuelan law. Many Latin American, American, and European countries recognized the new vice president. But it was not recognized by some countries, including Turkey. The turmoil in the country created a political vacuum, and the regime's opponents tried to fill it. Another reason for the increase in the problems experienced apart from lousy management is the economic problems.

Venezuela, like Colombia and other Latin American countries, often deals with economic problems. However, the economy of Venezuela has been worsening over the last seven years. Many private companies and businesspeople have left Venezuela (Testa, 2019). According to World Bank calculations, annual GDP growth of Venezuela decreased % 3.9 since 2014 (GDP Growth Venezuela, 2022). In 2021, inflation rate of Venezuela decreased from 2,959.8 % the number was in 2020 to 686.4 % (Armas, 2022). Between 2013 and 2019, the rate of GDP has lost 62% (Bull & Rosales, 2020). Maduro, whose presidency is not recognized by some countries, stated that “the hyperinflation period which lasted for four years had been over and the economy will grow up to four percent in 2021” (Daily Sabah, 2022). However, the hyperinflation affects still occur and damaging people who live in the country.

Venezuela has experiences one of the longest hyperinflation periods in the world. People still live in the lowest economic conditions. Incomes have been affected by the inflation and the results are really bad enough to reduce people’s living conditions. For instance, the minimum monthly salary in Venezuela equals to 1.50 USD (Armas, 2022). In the public sector, minimum salary is also very low and equals to 7 USD for a month (John, 2019). Some regulations on income and wages tried. In 2019, Maduro government increased the minimum wage but, this increasement covered only four percent of basic food expenses (Testa 2019). However, this response was not successful and unable for solving serious economic problems. Also, with the hyperinflation purchasing power of citizens’ have decreased dramatically. Comparing 2017 and 2018, people’s purchasing power decreased significantly, and their poverty rate increased in 2018. While in 2017, 89% of people said that they could not meet their food needs mostly, this rate increased to 95% in 2018. People only can provide their key and necessities. More than half of the population live in worse conditions than their families imagined for them (Silver et al., 2019). More than 80% of citizens say the economy is bad, and 60% say it is very bad. Due to the unstable economy, 80% of the citizens cannot meet the needs of their families, including their food and health needs, as well as their more personal needs such as clothing. Informal economy and unemployment have affected by increased poverty and mostly most vulnerable people has affected more.

The impact of hyperinflation on citizens continues very intensely. Many people have trouble meeting their basic needs and accessing basic services. Eating an effective and balanced diet has become very difficult in Venezuela in recent years. Almost 8% of the population is food insecure (WFP, 2020a). This rate is approximately two and a half million of the Venezuelan population. According to the same needs analysis assessment, one in three Venezuelans has difficulty in finding food and needs help. When Colombia opened its borders to Venezuela for two days in July in 2016, twelve thousand people flowed to the border for buying food (Casey, 2016). According to World Food Programme (WFP) assessment in 2019, 2.3 million people in Venezuela experienced food scarcity and they need humanitarian support. 59% of the population does not have enough resources to buy food, while 65% cannot meet other necessary needs such as hygiene products and clothing. Because of hyperinflation, has become very difficult for people to shop for groceries and groceries. Children are the most affected part by this situation, especially those living in poorer areas. This has affected people's nutrition and especially children spend their lives under the weight they should be. Childhood malnutrition rates have tripled since 2016 and early childhood deaths are also increasing sharply (World Vision, 2021). People in Venezuela also have difficulties in accessing other basic needs. Four out of ten families experience a power and water outage during the day (WFP, 2020a). In the same assessment study, the percentage of lack of access to potable water is 25 %. Families are very concerned about supplying their basic needs. Many health centers operating in Venezuela do not have enough medical stuff. People have problems accessing health services. Thirteen thousand health care professionals have left Venezuela (Standley et al., 2020). Cancer patients, people with cardiological diseases, those with chronic diseases, those who are HIV-positive have not been able to access proper treatment since 2016 (Venezuelan & Ausman James, 2019). The collapse of the healthcare system has led to an increase in diseases such as vaccine-preventable measles. Apart from these, there are frequent power outages because there is not enough supply for electricity.

Push factors as this thesis discussed above mainly on economic crisis forced 6 million Venezuelan to migrate. In a situation where so many people have to immigrate, it is very important to analyze their profiles in Colombia, where most of these people live. Because, along with the motivation of the people who come to the country, the profiles

of the people who come to the country also prepare a ground for understanding the immigration policy created by Colombia.

3.3.3 Profile of Venezuelans in Colombia

Colombian population increased by four percent between 2015 and 2019 due to hosting Venezuelans (Lebow et al., 2021). Apart from Venezuelans, Colombians who also live in Venezuela have also returned. The country has begun to undergo severe population profile change. The change is valuable, and to understand the effects of population growth, and it is necessary to analyze the profile of Venezuelans well. The profile of Venezuelan immigrants in Colombia can only be understood through studies because the Colombian state does not have comprehensive research to reveal the profile of such a large group.

The creation and understanding of Venezuelan migrant profile are important for implementing the planned policies effectively. At the same time, understanding the profile helps to understand economy, political and social situation of both host and sending country. Additionally, Latin America has never experienced such a migrant crisis before, a new term began to be experienced: xenophobia. Although they have common culture and history, the limited resources and increased number of people who need help in Latin American countries have revealed this situation. It is essential to understand the profile as it influences the global immigration debate and the influence of Venezuelans, such as Syrian refugees. If the profile of Venezuelans in the country is understood, the country's integration and labor policy can be effectively formulated. Various studies have been done to analyze profiles.

A study involving approximately fifteen thousand Venezuelan was published in IOM's International Immigration journal in 2018 and published in 2020. Participants in the study were the Venezuelans cross the Colombian border on foot. During their entry journey in Colombia, Colombian Immigration conducted survey while they were having legislation control with their identification documents. Considered gender equality and 56% male 44% female participated to the survey. The study results revealed that the vast majority of Venezuelan participants worked and received

training before emigration (Mazuera-Arias et al., 2020). From this result, can be said that the people who migrated have the motivation for finding better jobs in target countries. Mainly the study divided three different profile to understand main characteristics of Venezuelan migrants (Mazuera-Arias et al., 2020). The first profile included people who are older than 40, widows, low educated, and willing to access better conditions and health. Their main motivations are finding a better job because they do not have in Venezuela, access to better health services, and earn more money. The second type of profile included people age between 30 and 39. Their profile is different than profile one but not sharply. Most of them are married, have a secondary education level, and worked before emigration. Their primary motivation to migrate is to live in better conditions and send more money to their loved ones in Venezuela. The main characteristics of profile three are young people between 18 and 39. The majority of them are single, divorced without children and received a university degree or technical degree. Their primary motivations are having stress and future anxiety in Venezuela, living in better conditions, and having a brighter future. Profile three constitutes 48% of the profile and most migrants are young educated Venezuelans.

Another research showed that over 75% of the Venezuelans are working age, and 83 % finished at least secondary education. When Venezuelan immigrants are compared with the Colombian labor force, it is revealed that immigrants are better educated (Bahar et al., 2018). The majority of them, over 46%, are between the ages of fifteen and. More than 60% of them have secondary education and 12% completed university education (Ibid). Venezuelan migrants' education level is higher than Colombians. According to the same study, almost 40% of Colombians are secondary educated and practically ten percent of them completed university education. These percentages are lower than Venezuelans who flew to Colombia. We cannot say that Venezuelans in Colombia are low educated and not proper to include them into labor force. They have capacity and educational and technical background to involve society. There is also a rumor in Colombia that the crime rate of Venezuelans is high. However, this information is inaccurate, and there is data to refute this thesis. In 2018, only less than one percent of the crimes committed by Venezuelans in Colombia. There is no conclusive evidence that Venezuelans are increasing the crime rate in Colombia (Knight, Tribin, 2020).

According to Equilibrium CenDe survey, people who migrated Colombia and Peru have employment problems (Bonilla-Mejia et al., 2020). People who migrated to Chile and Ecuador intend to flee from Venezuela's violence (CenDe, 2020). Another study published by collaboration between MPI and IOM in 2021. According to this comprehensive study, most Venezuelans are young as already discovered by other studies. Their gender population almost equally distributed (Chaves-González et al., 2021). As supported by other studies, Venezuelans are closer to working age than receiving countries compared to receiving country profile. According to one study published in 2021 by collaboration between IOM and MPI, their findings support other findings that this dissertation mentions above. In Colombia, 40% of Venezuelans are in working ages (Chaves-González et al., 2021). Day after day, Venezuelans are getting settled in the host country. As time passes, the number of people who want to go to other countries decreases. More than 80% of Venezuelans living in Colombia have rented houses and continue living in those houses (Bonilla-Mejia et al., 2020). According to data from Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics, unemployment rates for those who left Venezuela in 2016 and those who left Venezuela now are pretty similar (Chaves-González et al., 2021). The employment rate of Venezuelan men is higher than women. Further, the income of men is higher than women and men earn more money. Compared to host community, Venezuelans working rate is higher than Colombians but Venezuelans receive less money. Also, unemployment rate of Venezuelans increases day by day in Colombia (Bonilla-Mejia et al., 2020). Although they leave Venezuela, most of them could cut connections with their country and their acquaintances there. Most of them have dependents in Venezuela. They send money by wire transfer and informal channels from Colombia to their families and acquaintances who stay in the country (Chaves-González et al., 2021). This actually provides hot money flow for Venezuela and support Venezuelan economy. Significant part of Venezuelans income does not circulate in Colombia and its economy is not supported as needed.

All these parts that this study emphasizes above including push factors of immigration and profile of Venezuelans in Colombia have huge impact on shaping Colombian immigration policy: Latin American immigration policy, conditions in Colombia and Venezuela, history of immigration from Venezuela to Colombia.

3.4 Colombian Immigration Policy for Venezuelans

The state of Colombia has followed very conservative immigration policies for years (Cuevas, 2020). There are many gaps in immigration policies and institutional structure. For this reason, Colombian immigration policy was not very successful during before 1990. The year 1990 was when Colombian immigration policy started to consider but fully comprehensive policy developed in the beginning of the 20th century (Mojica, 2015). During the 20th century, the main action on immigration policy was conducting strengthen visa controls for foreigners on migrant workers. However, this strengthened visa policy was not required for tourists and it was more flexible for people who would like to visit Colombia as a tourist. There has been no significant innovation and development effort in immigration policy from this date until the near future.

Until 2015, Colombia was an emigration state rather than an immigration state as discussed on previous Colombia chapter. Therefore, radical changes and additions began to be made in the Colombian immigration policy. The scenario has changed since 2015 due to receiving massive immigration flow from Venezuela. A visa exemption is applied for Colombians to enter the country (Library of Congress, 2022). At first, they came to the country taking advantage of the visa exemption, but they continued to stay as migrants and refugees. The fact that they entered the country legally but did not leave when their time expired made them irregular and illegal migrants. Unexpecting numbers on irregular status led the Colombian state and other international organizations which work for immigration to prepare some policies to make their status regular. Both Colombian state and international organizations started to take action against the situation.

In 2018, the state of Colombia established Border Management Office to improve coordination between government agencies and local agencies regarding the immigration topic. To continue the same aim Office of Colombian Immigration was created for Venezuelan migrants, transit, irregular and regular migrants. Regular immigrations cover people who use their passports while crossing Venezuela to Colombia. Usually, when they enter Colombia, people have 90 days with the possible

extensions is the legal duration in the country (Bracho & Politis, 2021). People who move to destinations other than Colombia can use Temporal Permission to Stay (*Permiso de Transito Temporal*). This permit can be used only by people who stay no more than 15 days in Colombia and wish to transit to other countries like Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. Irregular immigration is the most problematic category for the Colombian state. Another regulation done by the government was The Special Permit of Permanence (PEP- *Permiso Especial de Permanencia*) that created a floor to prepare temporary protection status.

3.4.1 The Special Permit of Permanence (PEP)

As a result of a lack of control and massive immigration flow, in 2017 Colombian state created special status for immigrations. Since the situation requires specific and affective political action. PEP 2017 to 2020 (Vicent, 2021). The first one was created in 2017 for accurate identification and regulation on Venezuelans' status and creating a pathway to provide them basic services like education, health and opening a bank account in Colombia to legalize their immigration status. More than 56 % of Venezuelans living in Colombia have irregular status (OAS, n.d), and making policies to regulate their status is crucial for both Venezuelans and the Colombian state. This was also an important step in fighting with crimes who target undocumented immigrants. Because of this protection, migrants became less vulnerable to criminals. Immigration authorities have announced to all Venezuelan migrants must register between April and June 2018. After this announcement, those who meet the necessary criteria will receive PEP status. People who entered Colombia before November 2019, can benefit from this status with signed passport and people who have irregular immigration status but have working permits up to two years (UNHCR, 2020). However, most of the Venezuelans who flew to Colombia do not have legal passports, and they leave their country without a legal document. A Venezuelan passport is highly expensive and costs at least 120 USD (Muñoz-Pogossian & Tufro, 2020). Most of the time, people cannot find official and legal ways to print passports. Usually, they use black-market and the black-market passports cost more than 2000 US Dollar. The cost is not enough itself. In Venezuela, application and receiving of passport take approximately six to twelve months (Vicent, 2021). On the other hand, most of the

time, due to insufficient materials, passports cannot be printed (Muñoz-Pogossian & Tufro, 2020). This is a developing problem once the date of passports expired its really difficult to get new one. However, some countries like Colombia, Canada, Argentina, Spain and the US recognize the Venezuelan expired passports up to five years (Muñoz-Pogossian & Tufro, 2020). Following requirements should be meet by Venezuelans to get PEP status (Brigard Urrutia, 2020): being in Colombia the date of this resolution (after July 2017), entering the Colombian territory with a stamped passport and controlled by Immigration Control point, having a clean criminal record nationally and internationally, not having any deportation situation.

The application system is free, people can apply from the Immigration Colombia website and then receive an email about their application process. The Special Stay Permits status automatically ends when the holder gets Colombian visa. Once they have PEP status, they can get an advantage from social services in Colombia. Because of PEP, thousands of Venezuelans had a chance to seek benefit from PEP outcomes and six thousand Venezuelans engaged in the formal labor market and economy (UNHCR, 2020). This was a turning point for Colombian immigration policy.

After implementing two phases of PEP, in 2018, Colombian authorities realized that most Venezuelans are using illegal ways to enter Colombia and do not pass national passport control services. Due to these irregular entries, PEP cannot be provided since it requires valid passport. To prevent this illegal situation and enhance PEP mechanism, Colombian state implemented Administrative Registry of Venezuelan Migrants (RAMV) also known as PEP-RAMV. Another phase which is PEP Foster Formalization (*Permiso Especial de Permanencia para el Fomento de la Formalización*, PEP-FF) (Save the Children, 2020). This is important because it is the first temporary protection status giving by Colombia to create employment regulation. This was targeted irregular Venezuelans for including them into formal labor market. Due to the high number of informal workers around the immigration population, Colombian state aimed to reduce informal working with this new phase. PEP phases also targeted many other sectors like education and training. For instance, in the PEP for Education Sector (PEP - E) young migrants and migrant children were targeted. Regulations for enrolling them into Colombian education system in multi levels pre-

school, primary and middle school and higher education made (R4Va, 2022). This step is an important step taken for both Colombians and Venezuelans for preventing lost generations. PEP created a floor to constitute more comprehensive immigration policy specially targeting Venezuelans. Through PEP basic services like education, access to labor market and be registered to Colombian system were provided to Venezuelans. In this way, the foundations for the Temporary Protection Status for Venezuelans (TPS) were laid and a smooth transition was made after creating a suitable ground.

3.4.2 Temporary Protection Status for Venezuelans (TPS)

On February 8, 2021, Colombia announced Temporary Protection Status for Venezuelans for ten years covering more than 1.6 million (UNHCR, 2021). Official regular status was provided by designing TPS (Emily, 2021). This is a very positive affect on Venezuelans who is willing to stay in Colombia with accessing basic services. This new status totally guarantees reaching for basic rights like education, health, accessing labor market, basic goods (UNHCRb, n.d.). To have an advantage from TPS first candidates should meet the PEP conditions. If they meet with these conditions and then they can apply for TPS. Applicants first should enroll to Single Registry of Venezuelan Migrants (*RUMV–Registro Unico de Migrantes Venezolanos*) system and start their TPS process. The system is online, free and it is easy to access (Ibid). Venezuelans need to share their personal data to enroll the system like giving fingerprints, photos, and signature. The evaluation process complete in soon and applicants are being informed whether their application approved or not (UNHCRb, n.d.).

Once they informed their application approved and they have TPP, they will be able to access many benefits. Like having an opportunity to access Colombia's Social Security Health and Pension System They can access education system at all levels including training and certificate programs for labor market (R4Va, 2021). This is important for effective integration which is migrant society struggles seriously. People who hold TPS pay their taxes like Colombian citizens, and this is very considerable converging effect for local people because they see these people gaining rights but also, they also fulfill some of their civic duties. In this way, they have support of

society empowerment, formal employment for effective social and economic cohesion. Newborn children are the future's most important social cohesion treat. Stateless children problem tried to solve with TPS, as Venezuelan children born in Colombia is very important plus factor for establishing effective immigration policy in Colombia. Until 2015 children born in Colombia was stateless and their access to identification was a problem. In 2015, Colombian state established new and very significant policy to solve this problem since then Venezuelan children born in Colombia have access to get Colombian citizenship (Muñoz-Pogossian & Tufro, 2020). It also covers retrospective births and children born after 2015 also acquired citizenship.

There are many positive aspects of TPS, but it also has some concerns especially from the side anti governments. They afraid about using TPS as a weapon during elections by giving these people voting and citizenship rights in the future. This fear strengthens by constitution dues to constitution of Colombia these people have right for voting in presidential elections (Emily 2021). Trying to apply such a comprehensive program to millions of people brings with it some concerns and effects. A good presentation of these effects is vital in terms of predicting the situations that Colombia may experience in the future due to its immigration policy. In relation to these concerns, as will be explained in the section on Turkey in the following sections, Colombia also made some forms according to needs and demands while establishing temporary protection status. Venezuelans entering Colombia were initially allowed to enter with the Border Mobility Card (*Tarjeta de Movilidad Fronteriza-TMF*), which was issued to 4.94 million Venezuelans (ILO,2021). This card provides Venezuelans to stay in Colombia legally up to one week.Later those who hold a valid passport were given the Entry and Permanence Permit (*Permiso de Ingreso y Permenancia- PIP*), thereby gaining the right to legally stay in Colombia for 90 days (ILO, 2021). But as described in previous chapters, most Venezuelans did not have a valid passport or any official document. As a result, many Venezuelans have entered country as without registered. Due to the need arising from their non-registration, Colombia eventually created the status of the PEP In this way, temporary protection status was given to irregular migrants who met the criteria described in the above sections but did not have a valid document. Apart from the development regulations for irregular migrants, a regulation called

Complementary Special Permanence Permit (*Permiso Especial Complementario de Permanencia-PECP*) was introduced for asylum applicants (ILO, 2021). In general terms, the temporary protection status applied in Colombia has evolved similarly to the temporary protection status in Turkey, which will be explained in the following sections. Both countries have shaped their temporary protection status in line with the needs and demands. For example, Colombia has granted Venezuelans the right to participate in the workforce with the special permanence permit for accessing formalization.

3.4.3 Impact of Immigration Policy

The impact of immigration policies on society, economics, social life, and education, is worthy to discuss. On society level, there are many different dynamics like discussing to give citizenship to Venezuelans or not. In Colombia, people cannot have citizenship based on birthright citizenship (Selee & Bolter, 2022). Since the country not providing citizenship to newborn Venezuelans in Colombia, integration has a huge impact on both Venezuelan and Colombian society. Thanks to PEP and TPS, many benefits were provided to fasten integration process of both adults and young generation. TPS provides chance to join the formal labor market. However, it did not produce the expected results, and only a few Venezuelans were able to participate in the formal economy. This may be the consequence of existed informal labor economy in Colombia which is between 48 and 63% (Lanau et al., 2018 cited in Selee & Bolter, 2022).

Another essential impact seen on access to education. TPS or PEP did not build such impact on education system because, Colombian law guarantees immigrants the right to education since 2015. As a result of this regulation about 200 thousand Venezuelans continue their education in Colombia (Selee & Bolter, 2022). This is very important step beginning for integration and the biggest reason for this integration to start is that most schools accept students regardless of their identity or status. However, it is not happening in reality because most of the surveys show that 44% of students without documentation or identity facing problems for enrolling schools (Ibid). Urbanization problem influences this undocumented application situation, because immigration

population is concentrated in metropolitan cities such as Bogota. Therefore, the burdens and responsibilities of big cities are greater in every field, including the field of education. Local school systems have been struggling with this burden and pressure. Students are schooling in crowded classes, and this accordingly affect the quality of education. Many Venezuelan immigrants have good educational and working backgrounds, so it is a positive impact in terms of integration and social impact.

3.4.4. International Interventions Impact

With the Temporary Protection Status for Venezuelans (TPS) issued by the Colombian state, both Venezuelans have been granted a 10year residence permit and the reach of aid has been determined. Thanks to TPS, it has become easier for Venezuelans to receive assistance, be protected, and access basic needs. At the same time, it has been clarified in which areas and to whom the aid of institutions and organizations will be provided. The needs of Venezuelans living in Colombia are mostly gathered in three areas: food (85%), shelter (64%), and livelihoods (46%) (R4Vb, 2021). In these areas, Colombia and Venezuelans Colombia need support from institutions. Cash assistance is another important area that needs support. 68% of Venezuelans who want to stay in Colombia stated that they need cash assistance and cannot meet their basic needs because there is no cash.

According to findings from study held and published by coordination through Inter-Agency Coordination Platform (R4V), IOM, UNHCR, and Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP), there are 4.83 million Venezuelans in need in Colombia (R4V, 2021). 2.4 million of these people including 364 thousand people from the host community targeted for the 2022 aid plan. To help these people in different need areas such as education, health, food security, transportation, protection, shelter, WASH, gender-based violence (GBV), integration and human trafficking and smuggling, 803-million-dollar budget allocated. In the same plan report, those who contributed to the budget were broken down by percentage. According to this distinction, the institutions that financially support this plan the most are thirteen UN Agencies with a ratio of approximately 70 % (R4V, 2021). Food security and health areas, which are one of the most important reasons for immigration from Venezuela,

are the areas where the most budget allocated, and the most people are helped. Colombia appealed to international institutions specially UN Agencies to help deal with this situation in 2018. An average of 4,000 Venezuelans cross the Colombian border a day and do not return to their country (Hidalgo & O'Connor, 2019). On this call for help, Refugee and Migrant Response (RMRP) plan was announced by International Organization for Immigration (IOM) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to draw an action framework in 2018 (Roth, 2021). In the same year, Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) by UN announced humanitarian rapid response for Venezuelan refugee and migrant crisis. Two UN Agencies, IOM and UNHCR, outlined regional response plan and created budget of 17.2 million dollar for humanitarian responses for the region covering six cities including Colombia (Hidalgo & O'Connor, 2019). Therefore, it is impossible for Colombia to deal with this situation alone without receiving help and support from international agencies.

When Venezuelans first entered the country, they were placed in shelters because the country did not have an immigration plan for such a large wave of immigration. Resettlement in shelters was a temporary process to develop a comprehensive and beneficial policy. Local NGOs started to work on building shelters to provide a stop section while migrants reaching to target country. Shelters were very significant action point for Venezuelans to go through the transfer process easily and safely. At the same time, these shelters temporarily provided people with basic needs. for example, a safe place, food, water and, where necessary, medical support (Roth, 2021). For these purposes, the first tent camp was opened in 2018 (Baddour, 2018).

In 2018, The US, through the US national agency, made the first \$2.5 million aid to Colombia to support Venezuelans in Colombia (Rendon & Schneider, 2018). In the same year, the US stated that this was the first welcome aid, and that the continuation of the aid would come. The World Bank has become one of the leading providers of funds and support to ameliorate the consequences of the refugee and migrant crisis in Colombia. In 2019, it started financing the first project in Colombia to support Venezuelan immigrants and the government, and to stabilize the legal rights of immigrants and refugees and help their integration process (The World Bank, 2021). The World Bank not only support legal and social cohesion process, but only support

their access to basic services such as health care services. In 2019, Colombian state supported by the World Bank for increasing the health systems and provide more opportunities to refugee and migrant society to access these systems. Since 2018, the World Bank supported Colombia for Venezuelan immigration crisis with establishing project for improving Venezuelans' and Colombian state conditions with partnership with UN Agencies with spending 1.6 million dollar (The World Bank, 2021). The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Immigration (PRM), Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) under the US state department USAID works on humanitarian aid, increasing poverty and helping people announced that 127-million-dollar support will be given to NGOs Works for refugees and migrants in Latin American region for supporting integration and economic activity projects (USAID, 2021).

The UN World Food Program (WFP) launched food assistance program to over 30 thousand Venezuelan children to provide food (USAID, 2021). For the same aim the US launched food program included 630 thousand vulnerable Venezuelan refugees, migrants and host community members and implemented food aid and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) support to these people with working NGOs. In 2021, at the International Solidarity with Venezuelan Refugees and Migrant Donors' Conference led by UNHCR and IOM in Canada, it was decided to provide \$1.5 billion in aid to Colombia for Venezuelan immigrants (Guzman & Marmolejo, 2021). Between 2019-2021, the US provided 1.65 billion aid to the Latin American region for Venezuelan migrants and refugees (Price, 2021). In 2021, the United States announced 247 million dollar in humanitarian aid and 89 million dollar in economic development relief funds for Latin American countries host Venezuelan migrants (Price, 2021). The purpose of these funds is to support Venezuelan host countries in the region and improve the conditions of Venezuelans. These economic funds, which were created because Latin American countries could not benefit even their own countries one hundred percent economically, were asked to be used as a motivation tool for the host country.

In this section, first of all, Latin American immigration policies and regional agreements created to respond to immigration waves, The Cartagena Declaration, and The Quito Declaration are discussed. The reason why these agreements are included

in this section is that Latin American countries act regionally and both Venezuela and Colombia are parties to these agreements as regional states. After these agreements, Colombian immigration policy was emphasized and the historical immigration movement between Colombia and Venezuela was examined. After examining the historical immigration relationship between these two countries, the reasons for immigration from Venezuela are discussed. The reason for discussing these reasons is to better analyze the immigration policies that Colombia has implemented until it establishes a temporary protection status. Apart from these, this section also includes the practices applied until the temporary protection status is created and the international interventions made for the immigration situation in Colombia to analyze Colombia's temporary protection status creation process and what temporary protection covers.

The final chapter of this thesis will cover the same frameworks that I discussed in this chapter to make proper comparative analyze between two cases.

CHAPTER 4

REPUBLIC OF TURKEY'S IMMIGRATION POLICY

Due to its geographical location, Turkey has historically been both a sending and receiving country. In order to meet the need for workers after the World War II, there was a labor immigration from Turkey to Europe. It is also a country where refugees fleeing the Soviets during the Cold War took shelter. Apart from these, as a result of the developments in the Middle East, it has become the target country of asylum seekers. However, since the subject of this section is not to analyze the immigration waves that Turkey has experienced in detail, I will briefly examine it in order to understand how Turkey has shaped the immigration wave experienced with the Syrian crisis in the light of these developments. Because the immigration waves and immigration trends that Turkey experienced before the Syrian crisis are cumulatively effective in forming its immigration management policy through temporary protection. To understand the process leading up to the creation of Temporary protection status, this chapter examines immigration policies before the Syrians; immigration flows from Middle East, Eastern Europe, international asylum seeker, refugee related agreements and protocols, the road to the Syrian crisis and the wave of immigration to Turkey, implementing of temporary protection status and some significant articles that have effect on immigration management such as non-refoulement.

4.1 Historical Background of Immigration in Turkey

Due to its geography, Turkey has been a country where massive immigration movements have been experienced throughout history. Looking at the flow in Turkey four main type of immigration flows came Turkey: irregular labor migrants, transit migrants, asylum seekers, refugees and regular migrants (İçduygu & Kirişçi, 2009 cited in İçduygu & Aksel, 2012). Although Turkey has been both a receiving and an emigrant country since the proclamation of the Republic, it did not make any regulation regarding foreigners until the 1950s (Eroğlu, 2015). In the 1950s, intensive approximately “4.5 million labor immigration movements” started from Turkey to European countries (IOM, 2008 cited in Canpolat & Arıner, 2012). Between 1980 and 1991 “1.5 million Iranians received temporary refugee status” Turkey created temporary program to let them stay in Turkey with visa. At the same time, majority of these “1.5 million Iranian used Turkey as a transit country” (Kara & Korkut, 2010). This enormous flow followed by Kurdish immigration flow in 1988. Later 60 thousand Kurdish people migrated from Iraq to Turkey and the Turkish government implemented open door policy at that time. 36 thousand Kurdish out of 60 thousand remained in Turkey. In 1990, refugees from Balkans came to Turkey; most of them were Turkish ethnic-based or Muslim Balkans. Thousands of people from different ethnicities, Bosnians, Albanians, Tatars, Kosovars, and Circassians had to leave their territories and come to Turkey. Turkey granted them temporary asylum. Later they settled in Turkey, most of them became citizens. Around the 2000s the US intervention to Iraq and Afghanistan displaced people and thousands of people escaped to Turkey. In that period, people from Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan received full refugee status. Totally, Turkey hosted almost 20 thousand according to 2008 data (Myers, 2017). From the 1980s to the 2000s, Turkey became a country of asylum for people fleeing the oppressive regimes in the Middle East. Apart from these, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, people from countries such as Russia, Romania and Ukraine immigrated to Turkey due to better economic conditions and political freedom (Kara & Korkut, 2010).

As in Colombian situation, Turkey is a country that receives a significant number of immigrants, and it is also a country of emigration. In the 1950s, the world started to experience fundamental changes, with the labor needs of developed countries beginning to increase. Remarkably, the division of Germany into two revealed the need for workers in West Germany. Therefore, labor immigration from Turkey, mainly to Germany and England, started in the 1950s (Kirişçi, 2014). Apart from the immigration to the West, there were immigrations from Turkey to some Middle Eastern countries such as Libya and Iraq and to Russia to meet the need for workers. Immigration to Turkey in the 1990s concentrated in Russia, and labor immigration occurred mainly to work in the construction sector (Kirişçi, 2003). Since then, Turkey has moved from being a country of immigration to a source country of immigration. Although it is primarily a country of immigration, Turkey has also become target and transit country. In other words, unlike the history of immigration, it has also come to the position of a country with a immigration corridor. Immigrants from Central Asia and the Middle East generally use Turkey as a transit country to pass to countries such as Germany, Italy, and Canada (Deniz, 2014). After the Syrian crisis started, Syrians started to use Turkey to reach Europe over the Aegean Sea. The reason for this is the importance of Turkey's geopolitical position. Due to its location, Turkey is also trying to cope with the problem of irregular migrants who wants to across Turkey border and reach Europe borders. At the same time, irregular immigration problem has occurred since uncountable immigration flow started from Syria. However, mainly irregular migrants are people from Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran not from Syria (Canpolat & Arner, 2012). Persons coming from these countries are those who seek asylum and asylum to resettle in third countries. This is also emphasizing Turkey's transit country position one more time.

As a result of all these developments that Turkey has experienced, Turkey has focused on strengthening the existing immigration policies and producing new approaches to deal with the crisis. Before starting Turkey's shaping process of immigration policy, we can say that immigration and asylum issues, which started with the mass immigration movements in the 90s, brought security concerns because the creation and development of immigration policies is a dynamic process. Therefore, one of the main issues of Turkey's international relations and agreements is immigration and migrant

movements. Today, Syrians are still not accepted as refugees in Turkey due to international agreements that Turkey is a party to and which I will discuss below. Moreover, Syrians and immigration are among the issues that occupy Turkey's agenda the most. The reason of this, Turkey's asylum and immigration policies are connected and attached with Turkey's foreign policy priorities (Bélanger & Saraçoğlu, 2019). Starting from this part, this study discusses the international agreements that paved the way for Turkey to create its policies.

4.2 Immigration Policy of Turkey

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the document on which refugee law is based because article 14 of the document states: "Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries" (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948). After the Second World War, the 1951 convention and the 1967 protocol were created under the leadership of UNHCR to establish refugee law and guarantee the rights of refugees. Apart from these, countries developed their asylum and refugee systems individually and started to apply their own legal rules. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to The Status of Refugees define it are the narratives that complement the refugee law. Although countries favor international immigration agreements, it is up to the nations to decide whom they will accept as migrants. But international agreements give direction to these decisions.

4.2.1 The 1951 and 1967 Conventions Relating to the Status of Refugees

Since the Syrians do not have refugee status, they cannot benefit from the rights brought by the refugees. Article 33 of the Convention "No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." (T.C. Resmi Gazete, 1968). This article is critical in order to protect the rights of refugees in the country they live in. Since Syrians are not recognized as refugees, they were not subject to this article and were subject to deportation. After the signing of the 1951 convention, the

1967 Protocol Relating to The Status of Refugees protocol was prepared to update the pre-1951 expression in the convention and announced it in 1968. Refugee definition in 1967 regulation; was left to the preference of the countries with the principle of geographical restriction by removing the expressions of events that took place before 1951 and temporal restriction. Geographical restrictions mean that it will only accept people from Europe as refugees. (T.C. Resmi Gazete, 1968). Turkey has only lifted the time restriction in this protocol. Turkey continues to apply the geographical restriction rule while implementing and developing its policies regarding irregular migrants from Syria.

On the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to The Status of Refugees, to which Turkey is a party, Turkey has shaped its efforts to manage the Syrian immigration crisis. However, these efforts and their effects cannot be analyzed in terms of Turkey's immigration management, starting from the framework of these agreements, without understanding the causes of the crisis in Syria and the ground that created the crisis.

4.3. The Immigration Urgency: Syrian Arab Republic

Syrian Arab Republic is a country in an important region of the Middle East home to many different ethnic groups, including Jewish, Kurdish, Arabs, Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians. Since it is home to many other groups, it has other ethnic, sectarian, and religious structures. As estimated the current Syrian population is almost 19.2 million (World Population, 2022); in 2011, at the beginning of the civil war, it was 23 million (Ayhan, 2011). In the same year, GDP was 2400 USD. Before civil war has started GDP was around 5000 dollars. Among all these groups, the majority is Arabs, covering 90% of the population (Karkın & Yazıcı, 2015). Sunni Muslims in the Hanafi sect are in the majority, followed by the Alevi group forming the second majority. There is a heterogeneous social structure, which was effective in the outbreak of the civil war. The difference between ethnic and religious groups caused the conflict.

4.3.1 Push Factors of Emigration from Syrian Arab Republic

Different reasons have caused immigration from Syria such as political, sect conflict factors, inability to access basic rights. The conflict between the Alevis and Sunnis living in the country has started the civil war. As a result of the wide rights granted to the Alevis living in the country and who are in a minority situation, and the arming of some of them, conflicts started between the two sides. The tension between the two sides increased, even more, when Hafez al-Assad, of Alevi origin, became the head of the country's administration in 1970. As a result of the discussions, opposition groups trying to oppose the government were suppressed with harsh interventions and a state of emergency was declared. Although he made different promises to Bashar Assad, who took the helm after his father's death in 2000, he continued his father's policies. Both father and son al-Assads followed the giving important government roles to Alevi people in Syria. Until 1980s the situation in Syria quite good and people were receiving basic and additional services without economic concerns. However, between 1980 and 1990 national income fell to a quarter. Democracy on the other hand was not working since al-Assads came to power. Bashar al-Assads became a president with getting 97 % of the votes (BBC, 2020). It seems like the country is managed by democracy on paper, but it is not.

When looking at political management, a new era began in Syria with the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, who had been ruling the country for 29 years in 2000. Since the country's official name is Syrian Arab Republic, which was not governed in a democratic way, his son Bashar al-Assad took duty after his father died. Syria, headed by a democratic regime on lament, has been run by the same family for fifty years. Due to the al-Assad family in Syria, a one-party system is dominant in practice, seemingly multi-party (Erhan, 2018). After Hafez al-Assad 's death, his son Bashar assumed the presidency in dictatorial ways, which seemed to be democratic in practice but were undemocratic. After son al-Assad came to power, he took over the entire Syrian army like his father (Erhan, 2018). Bashar al-Assad was initially more reformist, enlightened, and innovative than his father. He even announced the establishment of non-governmental organizations under his innovative policies (Ayhan, 2011). In this way, he consolidated his power in the first periods he came to

the presidency. He tried to suppress freedom of speech and the press. Opposition protests began to increase in 2011 with the effect of the Arab Spring. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) emerged during these oppositional structures. After starting disagreements and protests, 2011 has become a turning point for Syria; emigration movements have begun.

In 2015, within four years six million displaced Syrians arrived in neighboring countries (Yazgan et al., 2015). Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and many Middle East countries received massive asylum seekers in different periods. These three countries host the majority of Syrian refugees. Besides ISIS, many non-governmental actors Free Syrian Army (FSA), Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), Democratic Union Party (PYD) participated and conflict areas in Syrian began. These actors are anti-governmental actors trying to control important cities like Halep, Damascus using guns and bombs. Immigration rates have increased due to violence spreading with non-governmental actors. The consequences of civil war are really serious and have become one of the most severe humanitarian crises in the world. Since 2011, 22 million people have been forced to leave Syria and 6.7 million people have been internally displaced, and half of them are women and children. 13.4 million Syrian out of 19.2 million are struggling to reach basic needs and survive (Mercy Corps, 2017). Many Syrians cannot bring food to the table because eight out of ten live below the poverty line. Health services' profit is impossible because half of the hospitals and clinics were closed. Before the civil war, the Syrian government was controlling the health care system. Until the conflict, the conditions had been improving. However, when the war started lack of human source and medicines became more visible. Health care personnel started to leave the country; armed forces destroyed hospitals. Not only have government opposition armies bombed health services, but the Syrian government has also attacked and destroyed hospitals. As the data of World Health Organization (WHO), since 2013, 53% of government hospitals and 40% of ambulances were targeted and damaged. During those attacks more than hundreds of doctors were killed. Considering more than hundred thousand civilian including children were killed, lack of health services and persons made people even more vulnerable (HRW, 2014). This all varies from region to region because eight regions held by the government and other non-governmental actors. Therefore, all information and data about Syria are

predictive. The situation might be worse or better than this scenario. It is necessary to understand the profile of refugees fleeing due to the civil war and economic difficulties in Syria to analyze Turkey's immigration policy deeply. Therefore, in the next section, I will focus on the general profile of Syrian refugees, because push factors are related with population and its profile.

4.3.2 Profile of Syrians in Turkey

Syrian Barometer, which is the most comprehensive study that analyze the general situation of Syrians in Turkey conducted by Prof. M. Murat Erdoğan draw the most realistic profile results about Syrians. He has been conducting the study systematically since 2017. According to the research (Erdoğan, 2020), the ratio of refugees in the total population of Turkey was 0.01%. However, this rate rose to 4.38%, with 3,641,370 refugees in 2019. 95% of those refugees have a temporary protection status in Turkey, while without a specific confirmation, approximately 150 thousand of them had Turkish citizenship in 2021. All these information published by Directorate General for Immigration Management of Turkey (DGMM) which is the main responsible institution responsible for temporary protection status application starts with an online application by DGMM. The provinces with the most Syrians are Istanbul, Gaziantep, Hatay, and Şanlıurfa, respectively. The ratio of Syrians to the local population in these provinces varies between three and 27%. Gender distribution of refugees in Turkey is 54% of them are men, and 46 % are women. According to the 2017 Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) field survey data, the gender distribution of Syrians living outside the camps is almost equal (49% female, 51% male). The same study found that the majority of Syrians were between the ages of 19-54. Apart from this, the number of children living outside the camps is considerably higher. The ratio of children to the total population is 52.5%.

When Turkish and Syrians are compared by age, the people of Syrians are 10% younger than the local population. Only in 2020, ten thousand Syrian babies were born in Turkey, and this number has been increasing rapidly since 2016. The ratio of children to the total population is really high with 52.5% (AFAD, 2017). The reason for giving importance to the excess of the birth rate is that the children born cannot acquire citizenship by birth. Because Syrians born in Turkey cannot obtain Turkish

citizenship by birth within the scope of temporary protection status. This will cause confusion in the future. Considering the structure of society, it shows serious similarities about Syrian child number between Erdogan's study and AFAD's. Conducting studies and receiving data related with Syrians specially about young generation is important in terms of the impact of Syrian youth to education system and education system regulations. When we look at the schooling rates of Syrian children in Turkey, only 64% have been schooled (AFAD, 2017). Erdoğan pointed out in his study that refugees have severe education problems. Despite removing the residence permit requirement for children to enroll in school, the enrollment rate is still low. Most of the Syrians living in Turkey are at school age or in the age range to start working life. When the educational status of Syrians is examined, the findings are; 24.7% are illiterate, 14.9% are literate and secondary school graduates, 12.1% are high school graduates and 8.1% are university graduates. educational status of Syrians is much lower than that of Turks, and that most Syrians are uneducated. There is minimal and imprecise information regarding the educational status. However, according to the research, the academic status of most refugees is literate, but they do not have any diplomas (Erdoğan, 2020). Syrians, who cannot continue their education life due to the conditions in Syria, continue this attitude in future generations. Only 28% of children aged 5-17 who live in Turkey and are subject to compulsory school age to continue their education. However, the same study also reveals that the numbers have increased gradually thanks to the policies Turkey has implemented since 2014. The same study also examined the reasons why Syrian children stay away from school and determined that one of them is the perception of temporariness. While the perception of transience continues, they try to continue their lives in Turkey. As a sign of this statement, findings revealed that the majority of foreign businesses opened in Turkey between 2017-2018 belong to Syrians (Erdoğan, 2017).

To obtain working permit under temporary protection, they must have a temporary protection status for at least six months. They must work at the place where they are registered. At the same time, they are subject to rules such as foreign workers cannot be employed in a workplace that has more than ten percent of the total number of employees in the workplace. Since the informal economy in Turkey is relatively high, 30% of Syrians are also affected by these rules and regulations. About 40% of Syrians

have a job, and it is not clear how many work in the informal sector, but it is estimated that the majority of them work informally (Erdoğan, 2020). As in education, there is a gender inequality in working life and accordingly, 39% of the men and 61% of the women are not employed. Looking at the job categories of the working men, it was found that the majority of them worked in the manual labor category that does not require training. As a result, the data revealed that 50% of individuals do not have a profession. Working rates are also low at the same rate as vocational qualifications (AFAD, 2017). Men involve in working life more than women. Syrian Barometer also supports this while providing data evidence. The number of Syrian men, especially in the working-age range, is considerably higher than women.

4.4. Temporary Protection Status of Syrians in Turkey (SuTPs)

The immigration policy of Turkey has sharply shaped after the arrival of Syrians. Before their arrival, all migrant movements before Syrians somehow left Turkey or integrated since they cover a small population. However, the Syrian situation is totally different than other movements and its impacts have been visible in different aspects such as foreign relations with other countries and domestic politics. In order to tackle the situation, Turkey has created and implemented a special immigration policy for Syrians in Turkey and highlighted the “temporality” of the situation through generating a term called “temporary protection”. Therefore, in this section, the rights granted with temporary protection status will be explained with sample articles from the temporary protection law.

Although Turkey is a country that receives immigration, it did not face a mass immigration movement until 2011. Since the civil war started in 2011 and the Syrians left their country, the Turkish government (or Turkish officials) has begun to adopt an open-door policy. Even though the borders were closed occasionally, Syrians continued to enter Turkey in illegal ways when the borders were closed. While making decisions, the government did not think that the size of the crisis would grow this much and acted accordingly. Basic needs such as shelter, and food were provided to the refugees in the camps established within the scope of temporary protection. During that period of time, Research estimated that the number of people who would cross the

Syrian border would not exceed 100 thousand, but if it did, it was decided to establish a buffer zone (Köylü, 2018). In line with the estimations made at that time, in October 2011, considering this a temporary situation, temporary protection was granted to Syrians.

Along with producing a solution to the Syrian crisis by generating a new legal term, Turkey also immediately started to respond to the crisis physically. For instance, starting in 2011, Turkey began to build camps for Syrians and those who entered Turkey were hosted in these camps. Due to the fact that at that time, Turkish Republic did not have a fully functioning immigration management department when it comes to immigration, the responsibility of the centers has been given to the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) under the Prime Ministry (Kirişçi, 2014). Tent cities were established in towns on the Syrian border such as Hatay, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Kilis. Many basic needs, services such as education were also provided in these camps. It is supported by the temporary protection law that refugees can enjoy basic rights whether they live in camps or outside of camps. In 2013, Turkey announced 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) to provide specific status defined within temporary protection framework. The law 6458 provides basic rights to Syrians as study, work and accessing health services permit (Mackreath & Sağnıç, 2017). In this law the definition of temporary protection defined. Implementing this law was reflection of refugee implementations in Turkey. Even, the open-door policy that adopted by Turkish authorities defined. The principle of non-refoulement of temporary protection policy stated (Donelli, 2018). Accepting refugee's non-refoulement principle brought the idea of harmonization, social cohesion and sustainability. Non-refoulement defined as:

No one within the scope of this Regulation shall be returned to a place where he or she may be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment or, where his/her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014, p. 3).

In this article, emphasis on religion, race, nationality, age, gender, political opinion is very important as it underlines that refugees cannot be sent until the conflict in Syria is over. Another important point is that the Council of Ministers draws their authority.

Most of permission related with Temporary protection, the decisions are given to this institution.

The Council of Ministers shall be authorized to determine the following in its temporary protection decision:

- a) Persons who will be covered under temporary protection;
- b) Effective date of temporary protection and its duration if considered necessary;
- c) Conditions for extending and ending of temporary protection;
- d) Whether or not temporary protection will be implemented country-wide or in a specific region;
- e) Matters in respect to which the Board may take a decision and follow within the scope of Article 105 of the Law;
- f) Matters regarding decisions on limitation or suspension of admission into our country (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014, p. 4).

To make this, Turkey tried to establish some regulations, however the situation was bigger than sources that Turkey cannot deal with this situation alone. UN Agencies requested to support Turkey for contributing to decrease the burden of Turkey (Donelli, 2018). At this point, Turkey and EU announced that they have created joint program. The reason why EU involved and agreed to support Turkey, because this program has articles about preventing illegal refugee entries to EU borders (Mackreath & Sağnıç, 2017). The biggest motivation behind the EU's support for Turkey is to protect its own borders and unity. In return for this agreement, Turkey would receive financial support for refugees and visa liberalization while entering EU borders, while the EU would have kept refugees away from its borders. However, this did not go as planned by the Turkish side and until now Turkey has not been granted a visa facility by the EU (Aras & Duman, 2018). In order to strengthen Turkey's economy and to minimize the economic problems that refugees may cause, Turkey registered the right to work to all registered refugees in 2016 (Carpio, Seker, & Yener, 2018).

To give an example, Article 59 draws attention to the right to receive education and mentions that education such as formal education, language education and vocational training will be provided to refugees wherever they are located either in camps or

cities. In the same article it is clearly underlined that the Ministry of National Education is in charge to ensure this (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014). From articles in the law, it becomes clear that there are specific new areas of jurisdiction (or jurisdiction areas) assigned to public institutions, especially ministries, because of the refugee crisis.

In other words, since 2011, Syrians in Turkey have “temporary protection” status with the decision of the Ministry of Interior (Orhan & Gündoğar, 2015) and granted in the structure of Article 91 of Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (YUKK) (General Principles of Temporary Protection, n.d.) and they could enjoy fundamental rights according to the law. However There is no explanation in this regulation regarding the temporary protection period and this point emphasized by the law. Article 25 pays attention to residence permit of refugees in Turkey. It focuses on their rights to stay in Turkey while emphasizing it doesn’t mean that they have residence permit. This article is significant because it also underlines that the duration of stay in Turkey is given by the governorships and emphasizes the temporality.

(1) The refusal of an application lodged in Turkey, non-renewal or cancellation of a residence permit and notification of such actions shall be done by the governorates. The decision on the residence permit may be postponed in consideration of elements such as the foreigner’s family ties in Turkey, the duration of residence, situation in the country of origin and the best interest of the child during these actions (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, p. 10).

(2) Refusal, non-renewal or cancellation of the application shall be notified to the foreigner or, to his/her legal representative or lawyer. This notification shall also include information on how foreigners would effectively exercise their right of appeal against the decision as well as other legal rights and obligations applicable in the process (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, p. 10).

The authorities, who thought that the process would be temporary, continued their open-door policy, often saying that they were on the side of the Syrian people and that there was a human rights violation in Syria.

In 2013, with the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, Turkey’s immigration policy took a new dimension, and the DGMM was established. The

formation of the DGMM has erased one of the obstacles in the immigration governance. Because the purpose of establishing the Presidency of Immigration Management is to make tailored immigration policies and be responsible for implementing these policies. It is planned to implement long-term, more comprehensive, and effective immigration policies. With the establishment of the DGMM and the institutionalization of immigration policies, the regulation of entry and exit and work permits for foreigners entering the country has become more systematic. Although Immigration Management was established in 2013, UNHCR assumed responsibility for the registration of Syrian refugees until 2018. With the support of UNHCR, Turkey managed to register more than half of the refugees who came in 2014 (Kirişçi, 2014). However, it should be mentioned that due to the lack of control of refugees living outside the camps, the registration process of the Syrians who escaped from the civil war and took refuge in Turkey lasted approximately three years because of the number of arrivals, and after the completion of the first round, the system has considered effective. Apart from UNHCR's assistance, Turkey has developed its own system for registration. According to this system, receiving Temporary Protection status requires to complete some steps. First of all to start their application process, people must pre-register. As a result of the changes made in 2018 and 2019, the decision authority of temporary protection status was changed to the president. At the same time, biometric registration and fingerprint requirements were introduced to register irregular migrants (Erdoğan, 2020). If the temporary protection decision is terminated, refoulement may be possible if deemed appropriate. In addition, the condition that their right to benefit from the services they have is valid only in the province where they are registered has been introduced. These new rules aimed to prevent the uncontrolled movement of Syrians within the country. In fact, granting temporary protection status starts at this step. Because in this way, they can benefit from health services free of charge during their stay in Turkey. Temporary protection status is given by the Provincial Immigration Administration to persons whose pre-registration process is positive and whose application documents are complete. Persons who receive the Temporary Protection Card may be involved in transactions that require legal permission, such as making a contract and enrolling in schools in Turkey. Also, it allows family reunification. After receiving temporary protection ID, they obtain some basic rights, but it doesn't mean that they receive Turkish citizenship.

Even, children born in Turkey do not receive Turkish ID. Instead, they receive temporary protection ID card (Refugee Rights Turkey; Refugee Solidarity Network; Dutch Council for Refugees; US Department of State, Bureau of Population Refugees, and Immigration, 2017).

Syrians in Turkey have also changed Turkey's relations with the EU through being a host community for millions of Syrians since immigration has become a security tool in recent years, the EU has increased its cooperation with third countries, such as Turkey, that large host numbers of refugees to prevent possible irregular immigration movements to the borders of the Union. The use of Turkey as a immigration corridor by immigrants from Asia or Africa to illegally cross into Europe has caused the EU to shape its policies beyond its borders. Since the EU and Turkey share borders, the securitization of immigration issue among the European countries has increased the importance of Turkey as an actor. The EU's immigration policy toward Turkey is mainly based on security concerns. In order to reduce the level of anxiety originating from the security concerns, the EU has used readmission agreements or the so-called 'deals'. The aim of these agreements is to prevent people who wish to reach the borders of the EU and if they manage, send them back to Turkey (Canpolat & Ariner, 2012). Turkey's immigration management predates the arrival of Syrians. With the arrival of Syrians in Turkey the characterization of immigrants as security and the economic burden has increased within the Turkish society, too, and there are discussions that immigration policies have started to take shape on this burden discourse (Eroğlu, 2015). As a burden, financial and social impacts are considered. Work permit article added to the law to enable Syrians to contribute to the Turkish economy. Article 89 underlines that refugees must have a work permit to work in Turkey and that this permission is given by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey).

Apart from economic burden discussions, there are also discussions where immigration policies are primarily concerned with security but with human rights focus due to negotiations with the EU (Eroğlu, 2015). The EU wants to keep immigrants in Turkey to protect themselves from the irregular immigration waves coming through Turkey. One of the reasons Turkey did not abolish the geographical

restriction in the 1951 Convention Article 33 is related to this strategy. It is argued that Due to the EU's policy to prevent irregular immigration through signing agreements with third countries, the government continues to get support for its immigration policies financially (İçduygu & Aksel, 2014). Due to this dynamic, Turkey's immigration policies tend to be shaped by the procedures followed by the EU. Turkey has been experiencing essential reforms on the immigration management process. The actor behind these reforms could be the EU because of the agreements between Turkey and the Union. The EU has fundamental reform of these reforms. According to the agreement, all irregular migrants trying to cross the Greek border were returned to Turkey and the EU covered their registration implemented by UNHCR and costs. Both its social and economic effects have started to be seen since the agreement was signed. The EU committed to pay six billion euros to Turkey in the readmission agreement signed in 2016, but this commitment was completed in 2020. This money was transferred to integration, economic and psychological empowerment projects for Syrians in Turkey within four years (Deutsche Welle, 2020). However, this is not enough, and Turkey is not in a position to cope with this situation with such little support, in terms of both its economic and social structure. The fact that Turkey is a de facto transit country makes it a transit country for many immigrants (İçduygu & Aksel, 2014), and this is a strategy Turkey has implemented in its immigration policy. As a result of the lack of sufficient support and some disagreements between Turkey and the EU, the readmission agreement was suspended until the visa liberalization began (Deutsche Welle, 2019). Moreover, as a result of the Idlib attack in 2019, President Erdogan criticized the EU for not providing the promised aid, and tension arose between the two sides. President Erdogan's statement in which he mentioned that he would open the doors if the EU did not provide the necessary assistance was perceived as a threat by the EU parties (BBC, 2020). From the beginning of the Syrian civil war up to today, the irregular migrant and refugee crisis that Turkey has been experiencing is causing the relations between Turkey and the EU to deteriorate. As countries implement their own practices, a guide was published by the EU Council in 2014, which includes the issues to be observed in temporary protection practices. We can emphasize that, as a result of the Syrian crisis, which will take place in the publication of the guide, the asylum applications of the displaced persons to the neighboring countries are taken as a precaution. Displaced people or the subject of the

temporary protection described in EU Council as ‘They are people who had to leave their country or who evacuated their country upon the call of an international organization and could not return due to security reasons’ (Geneva Convention 1951).

The policies made and the items added to temporary protection have been shaped according to the needs of Syrians and Turks in the society. Although basic rights such as shelter, health and education were granted first, additions were made as the duration of Syrians' life in Turkey increased. For example, they are given the right to apply and work through employer and to work for a more sustainable life. Even if a work permit is granted, there are some items that prevent participation in working life, such as the fact that the work permit is issued by the employer, the work permit is valid only in the relevant province, and the cost of registration is excessive (ILO,2021). From this point of view, although the emphasis on hospitality cannot be understood directly, it is understood indirectly. Because participation in working life and obtaining a regular income may bring along a mentality that Syrians will have long-term plans in Turkey. Policies evolved from the Law of Foreigners and International Protection and were shaped into the temporary protection law, which was shaped according to the needs and demands. However, the fact that the right to citizenship is not fully recognized and the temporary protection is extended after three years clearly reveals the ad hoc and soft immigration policies applied to these people over the temporary protection status. Even Syrians with temporary protection status are defined as "guest" in Turkey. This discourse also constitutes an important context for understanding their temporality in society, regardless of temporary protection status (ILO, 2021).

Historically, Turkey is both a sending and receiving country. Especially as a result of the developments in the Middle East, it has been both a destination and a transit country for those coming from the Middle East since the 20th century. With the start of the Syrian civil war, Turkey's position and immigration policies have evolved into a different dimension. Turkey has benefited from its experiences while shaping its immigration policies. For example, although Turkey is a part of the 1967 protocol to the 1952 Geneva Convention, it applies a geographical restriction to immigrants who do not come from Europe. Since it only granted refugee status to immigrants from Europe, it created temporary protection status for almost four million Syrians who

came from Syria and currently live in Turkey. The temporary protection status created was cumulatively created according to the needs of both the host and Syrian communities. In order to be able to analyze the immigration policies created, in this section, the causes of immigration in Syria and the demographic structures of Syrians in Turkey are discussed. After that, the stones that went to temporary protection, which Turkey started to build, were examined. Temporary protection articles and the cumulative needs of these articles are discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Immigration is a broad issue falling into the borders of many disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology and international relations. There are different theoretical approaches to immigration that focuses on different aspects of immigration. The effects and consequences of immigration are extensive. Although many immigration waves have existed throughout the history, their effects, arguably, were not felt as intensely as in the 21st century. We live in the age of immigration. The coining is not surprising because of the massive immigration movements that the world has been experiencing. Although there are general trends in the world, two major movements of this age have had the most significant impact: people migrated from Venezuela to Colombia and Syria to Turkey. Venezuelan and Syrian immigration experiences and consequences show parallel traits. Although those who migrated from their countries have different motivations, they migrated for a better life conditions as a result of the political turbulence in their countries. Under Venezuelans immigration movements, economic problems, internal political conflicts in Venezuela have forced millions of people to migrate to other countries. On Syrian migrating movements side, the Syrian political infighting which would be referred to as Civil War presented a major push factor for the masses.

Due to the reasons discussed in previous chapters, most Venezuelans migrated to Colombia and most Syrians migrated to Turkey as the neighboring country. Because of their geographical affinity Turkey and Colombia became the first countries what the migrants arrived. However, due to evolving global migration management strategies,

there previously transit countries evolved to be host countries where millions of Syrians and Venezuelans reside. Both Turkey and Colombia followed open-door policies for their neighbors, Syria and Venezuela. As a result of the open-door policy almost four million Syrians and two million Venezuelans became a topic of immigration policy discussions in Turkey and Colombia.

Although both countries have different historical accounts and immigration management principles discussed in the above chapters, they happened to apply similar practices under temporary protection status. Turkey has historically been a country of emigration and until the Syrian Civil War, there was no significant immigration wave to or from Turkey to Syria. On the other hand, Colombia and Venezuela have experienced an intertwined immigration movement throughout history. There was a wave of emigration from Colombia to Venezuela in the 20th century, before starting from Venezuela to Colombia. These two waves of immigration, which took place on two different continents of the world and affected millions, are currently considered the two largest immigration movements that the world has experienced and is going through. The reason why these two movements are recognized as the two most massive immigration waves is because over six million Venezuelans and over fourteen million Syrians were displaced within or outside their countries.

When we look at the immigration and emigration dates of both countries, we observe both differences and similarities. Both countries were once both receiving and sending countries. But the situation is different now when compared to Venezuelans and Syrians. While Colombia immigrated to Venezuela at the end of the 1900s, there was no immigration from Turkey to Syria. Although there has been an immigration flow between Colombia and Venezuela throughout history, before the Syrian Civil War, only 635 people migrated to Turkey from Syria between 1995 and 2013 (Kirişçi, 2014). Historically, there has been a bilateral immigration between Colombia and Venezuela. Colombia and Venezuela have similarities in their social and cultural structures due to their past immigration experiences, cultural similarities, living together during the colonial period and the independence process, speaking the same language, and adopting the same religion of the majority. Initially, for both groups,

countries only provided residence permits to those with passports and allowed them to live outside the camps.

Immigration from both Venezuela and Syria occurred mostly to neighboring countries and they made their immigration journey on foot. This means that they cross the borders of Turkey and Colombia on foot. From this, it is clearly understood that the open-door policy implemented by both Turkish and Colombian authorities. As a result of the open-door policy they implemented, the refugees, who came in small waves at first, started to arrive as a mass immigration flow after a certain period of time. This has caused countries to create new immigration policies to cope with the mass immigration crisis. Although both countries are part of the Geneva Convention, in the face of these massive population waves from Syria and Venezuela, Turkish and Colombian states did not recognize them as refugees. Turkish state did not accept Syrians as refugees, according to the geographical restrictions of the Convention. Similarly, Colombian state did not recognize Venezuelans as refugees by showing the agreements to which it is a party. Consequently, both countries adopted and adapted a previously existing status of temporary protection. A status that was first developed as a response to the massive arrival of people from Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1998 and 1999.

Although temporary protection status has increased its popularity with the examples of Syria and Venezuela, the history of temporary protection goes back to the World War II as discussed in the sections above. Temporary protection status included in The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol became widespread in the world after the second world war and nowadays it has started to come to the fore with the Venezuela and Syria crisis. Day by day, the number of persons granted temporary protection status by Turkey and Colombia has increased. The reason for this is that the population rate of Syrians and Venezuelans has increased significantly compared to the host society. Birth rates have increased significantly after both Venezuelans and Syrians came to Colombia and Syria (Lebow et al., 2021).

There are three different profiles of refugees immigrating from Venezuela to Colombia (Mazuera-Arias et al., 2020). The first one is those over 40 years of age with a low

level of education, who come to find a better job and to work. The second is those between the ages of 30-39 who have a relatively good education level and who migrate to find a job. Finally, they are educated people under the age of 30 who come to find a better future. The last group that has the highest rate among these three groups is the young population. These demographic features are not dissimilar to the Syrians as the vast majority of Syrians are also young people.

When comparing education level of Syrians and Venezuelans, the education level of Syrians in Turkey is lower than Venezuelans in Colombia (Erdoğan, 2020). Another difference is that the education rate of Colombians hosting Venezuelans is lower than Colombians (Bahar et al., 2018). However, the situation is the opposite for Turks who host Syrians, and the education rate of Turks is higher than the Syrian population (Erdoğan, 2020). At least 40% of Venezuelans have secondary education, while the proportion of Syrians who have completed secondary education is 22%. When the education profile of Syrians is examined, studies conducted since 2017 reveal that there is a decrease in educational status (Erdoğan, 2020). Give serious differences in educational status for the two groups. It is noteworthy that there are differences in education level between the two groups, but that similar education policies are implemented within the scope of temporary protection status. Because people who receive temporary protection status in both Colombia and Turkey can enroll in schools with temporary protection status documents and benefit from their right to education. But in Colombia, a different practice has been introduced in recent years, where children without an ID are now allowed to enroll in primary school. In this case, it is noticed that improvements have been made in the field of education in the temporary protection status of Colombia. Venezuelans, who already have a better educational background than the host society, also have a good technical and professional background. The fact that the population is young and has technical skills provides a suitable basis for Venezuelans to participate in the working life.

When their participation in business life is compared, for instance, 40% of Venezuelans are in the working age range (Chaves-González et al., 2021). Considering the Syrians, it is noteworthy that this rate is more than 50% (Erdoğan, 2020). For these two populations in the age group suitable for work, work permits were granted within

the scope of temporary protection status. Six months after obtaining temporary protection status, Syrians can apply for a work permit by applying to the Ministry of Labor (Temporary Protection Regulation of Turkey, 2014). Since it takes up to three years to obtain temporary protection status in Colombia, Venezuelans can obtain a work permit even if they have a valid visa without obtaining temporary protection status (Vicent, 2021). However, Colombia also grants Venezuelans the right to work permits with temporary protection status. There is a similar situation in the case of Turkey. With the Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection law enacted in 2016, Syrians have been granted the right to work permits in Turkey. The main motivation for both countries to obtain work permits under temporary protection is to reduce the number of unregistered workers. Because both in Colombia and Turkey, persons with temporary protection have a significant proportion in the informal economy (Staff, 2019). Access to fundamental rights is provided in similar ways in both countries. The process they apply to access these fundamental rights is also very similar. There are many similarities, such as the way they apply for temporary protection, their free registration, and access to health and other fundamental rights through this process. Colombia offers Venezuelans with temporary protection.

Turkey did not grant asylum seeker status to Syrians but rather adopted the temporary protection status. When Colombia implemented the TPS, it initially applied it to those who entered the country legally, but later this status was applied to those who entered the country without a visa. Turkey started to apply this policy by registering people who crossed the border without a legal entry requirement. Venezuelans under temporary protection were included in the general social system in Colombia. In this context, they could continue their education and benefit from health services. Temporary protection in Turkey also provide similar opportunities to Syrians. Syrians can benefit from social services such as accessing health services, education rights, and access to the labor market. Nevertheless, since Colombia's healthcare system is said to be inadequate, the system seems to be more challenging for both the host community and the immigrants. The situation is not significantly different in Turkey. Both Turkey and Colombia are middle income countries with some resource challenges. Naturally, both the host and migrant communities are affected by these

inadequacies. Regarding the access to education rights, Venezuelan children in Colombia can enroll in schools without proofing any documents until high school. However, Syrian children in Turkey should have a temporary protection identity for enrolling in schools. Colombia's policy is a crucial step toward preventing lost generations.

Implementing TPS provides an opportunity to engage the labor market in Colombia. As I discussed above, Colombia created a particular TPS for only access to the labor market. It is a theoretically good example. However, since labor market and employment opportunities are limited in Colombia, Venezuelans and Colombians face struggles to engage in the labor market. Therefore, people tend to work informally as cheap labor. At the same time, registered work requires multiple obstacles for migrants. They need to collect many documents and pay a registration fee. Syrians in Turkey have the same experience as Venezuelans. Both Turkey and Colombia provided work permits for them, but in the implementation stage, there are many challenges.

Regarding citizenship, Colombia gives citizenship to Venezuelan children born in Colombia, while Turkey does not grant citizenship to Syrians. Children born in Turkey become Syrian citizens if they can obtain citizenship from Syria, but if they cannot, they become stateless. It is impossible to say which of these two different applications is better. However, the results can be analyzed in the long term. Because in cases where citizenship is given, while the demographic structure of countries changes, granting it may be an accelerator of integration. At the same time, Colombia can issue a permanent residence permit after giving a residence permit for ten years, but there is no such practice for Syrians in Turkey.

In the case of Turkey and Syria, it is seen that both countries do not resemble each other culturally and socially, except for the border regions. Despite the fact that the majority have adopted the same religion, it is noteworthy that they speak different languages and cultural differences. The cases worth for investigating that the two countries that receive immigration from different and similar societies respond with a similar immigration policy. Both countries view Venezuelans and Syrians as

temporary, no matter how similar or different they are, and therefore have responded to immigration crises with temporary protection status. With the temporary protection regulation, governments automatically provide services such as health and shelter to refugees, while at the same time adopting the principle of non-refoulement (Kirişçi, 2014).

To explain the comparison, I made on temporary protection and cases above, this study examines the immigration approach, different immigration terms such as refugee, migrant, asylum seeker. Because without understanding immigration approach and the terms policies cannot be analyzed. Different terms bring different content of immigration policies. When migrants accepted as refugee, they received the rights according to refugee law signed by that country. I focused on experience of creating common Latin American immigration policy and steps because as a Latin American country Colombia established its own immigration policy based on Venezuelans through common policy. I discussed the conditions in both sending and receiving countries and the push factors why Syrians and Venezuelans had to leave their countries. In addition to this, Venezuelan and Syrian population in Colombia and Turkey discussed because Colombia and Turkey shaped their immigration policy through the refugee profile. Both Turkey and Colombia shaped temporary protection status and provide similar services. However, Colombian temporary protection status is more extensive and its cover more rights to Venezuelans than Turkey does. Validation of temporary protection status is higher in Colombia. On the other hand, Turkey has more open and comprehensive studies about Syrians. Syrian Barometers published by Erdoğan provide more data about the requirement of refugee community. At the same time, these scholars measure the opinion of host community on refugee community. Although so many studies have been done and needs have been identified, the temporary protection status they apply in Turkey is much more limited.

The two most significant immigration movements in world history, Venezuela and Syria, feel their effects throughout the world. Colombia and Turkey, the most affected by these two crises, are trying to overcome the crisis with the policies they are trying to implement. Although these two countries are in the middle of the same crisis in different geographies, they carry out similar policies. Since Colombia hosts almost two

million Venezuelans and Turkey four million Syrians, they are not very successful in implementation. It is impossible for countries hosting such a large number of immigrants to resolve the crisis fully. In particular, the fact that both countries have economic and political problems has affected the migrant crisis policies. Although Colombia follows a more comprehensive temporary protection policy than Turkey, it will be understood whether it is successful in the long run or not.

Although Colombia and Turkey have different immediate reactions, they go through similar processes and carry out similar immigration management principles. As the risks of massive immigration have increased in the globalizing world, immigration crises have begun to be experienced more. Based on the example of Colombia and Turkey, countries try to manage these immigration crises in a softer way, temporarily and effectively, and shape their immigration policies accordingly. At the same time, as these countries cannot solve these immigration crises on their own, the situations remain ad hoc. Under the light of research in this study which are compatible with the existing studies, these soft management and temporary management principles were shaped under several global constraints. Regardless of the consequences of these policies, the lack of necessary resources and macro-economic conditions shape the process of integration of new comers into the country. To emphasize this point, it is apt to quote OAS Secretary General Almagro: Once he said, “No country can face this wave of migrants and refugees in isolation,” referring Venezuelan immigration movement. These words could easily apply to the Syrian crisis in Turkey (OAS, 2018).

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

Göç insanlık tarihi boyunca var olan ve oldukça geniş etkilere sahip bir olgudur. Fakat özellikle 2010'ların başından beri etkileri ve dolayısıyla popülerliğı gittikçe artmaya başlamıştır. Bunun sebebi ise dünyanın farklı kıtalarında yaşanan kitlesel göç hareketlerinin artmasıdır. Göçün farklı yoğunluk ve dinamiklere sahip olması; farklı coğrafyalarda benzer, aynı veya farklı etkilerle dünya için önemli bir olgu haline gelmesine sebep olmuştur. Öyle ki dünya nüfusunun yaklaşık 90 milyonu doğduğu topraklar dışında hayatlarını devam ettirmektedir. Dünya üzerinde en fazla göçmen nüfusuna ev sahipliğı yapan Avrupa ve Asya kıtalarıdır. Bu iki kıta yaklaşık olarak göçmenlerin yüzde 60'ından fazlasına ev sahipliğı yapmaktadır. Göçün etkilerinin bu derece fazla olması, oldukça fazla insanı etkilemesi ve dünyanın farklı kıtalarında etkilerini göstermesi araştırmacıların göç hakkındaki çalışmalarını yoğunlaştırmıştır. Göçün önemli bir fenomen haline gelmesi farklı disiplinlerde göç çalışmaları üzerine bilimsel bir literatür geliştirilmesine sebep olmuştur. Gün geçtikçe kapsamlı bir literatürün oluşması yeni ve ortak olarak kabul edilen kavramların türetilmesini de beraberinde getirmiştir.

Göç literatürüne bakıldığı zaman farklı çalışmaların yer aldığı görülmektedir. Fakat ortak olarak göçün insanların daha iyi koşullara ulaşma eğilimi çerçevesinde gerçekleştiğı yer almaktadır. Bu yüzden de Küresel ölçekte göç eğilimleri ve hareketleri daha az veya kısıtlı kaynakların olduğu ülkelerden daha fazla ve çeşitli kaynakların yer aldığı ülkelere doğru gerçekleşmektedir. Fakat bu durum dünya düzeninde yaşanan değişimler sonucunda farklı bir boyuta evrilmiştir. Özellikle günümüzün en önemli göç hareketleri olarak kabul edilen Venezüella ve Suriye'den gelen göç dalgalarıyla göç hareketlerinin kaynakların kısıtlı fakat konum olarak daha

yakında yer alan ülkelere doğru yöneldiği görülmektedir. Kaynak ve ekonomik durumdan gelişmekte olan ülkeler arasında yer alan Kolombiya ve Türkiye yaşamış olduğu bu kitlesel göç hareketlerine benzer şekilde göç politikaları uygulayarak cevap vermeye ve göçün etkilerini olabildiğince en aza indirmeye yönelik politikalarla cevap vermeye çalışmaktadırlar. Her ne kadar devletlerin kitlesel göç hareketleriyle başa çıkmaları için etkili ve iyi formüle edilmiş politikalara ihtiyaçları olsa da, bu iki ülke örneğine bakıldığı zaman: Türkiye ve Kolombiya'nın geçici yöntemlerle, kriz anıyla başa çıkmak için Geçici Koruma Politikası oluşturarak cevap verdiklerini görüyoruz. Göç politikaları kaçınılmaz olarak dünyanın farklı bölgelerindeki önceki deneyimlere dayandığı için İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Yugoslavya Krizi'ne cevap olarak üretilen ve uygulanmaya başlayan Geçici Koruma Politikasından yola çıkarak Kolombiya ve Türkiye'nin Geçici Koruma Politikası bazında göç politikalarını inşa etmiştir. Fakat, kabul edilen evrensel ve bölgesel göç anlaşmaları, deklarasyonlar ve göçle ilgili tanımlar vardır ve bunlar Türkiye ve Kolombiya'nın göç politikalarını inşa etmelerinde etkili olmuştur.

Kolombiya'nın göç politikalarını inşa etme sürecinde hem parçası olduğu bölgesel anlaşmalar hem de taraf olduğu uluslararası anlaşmalar etkili olmuştur. Latin Amerika'nın önemli ülkelerinden biri olan Kolombiya'nın göç politikası inşa etme süreci taraf olduğu bölgesel anlaşmalar, göç politikasını inşa etme sürecinde bir yapıtaş olarak yer almaktadır. Bunun dışında hem göç veren ülke Venezüella'nın hem de göç alan ülke Kolombiya'nın taraf olduğu Mültecilerin Hukuki Statüsüne Yönelik 1951 Cenevre Sözleşmesi de önemli bir yere sahiptir. Sonuç olarak Kolombiya, bölgesel olarak taraf olduğu Cartagena Deklarasyonu, Quito Deklarasyonu ve Mültecilerin Hukuki Statüsüne Yönelik 1951 Cenevre Sözleşmesi'ne göre ekonomik sebepler yüzünden Venezüella'dan Kolombiya'ya kitlesel olarak göç etmiş kişiler mülteci olarak kabul edilmemektedirler.

Kolombiya örneğinde olduğu gibi Suriye Arap Cumhuriyeti'nde 2011 yılında başlayan iç savaş sonucunda kitlesel olarak Türkiye'ye sığınmış kişiler de Türkiye'nin taraf olduğu Mültecilerin Hukuki Statüsüne Yönelik 1951 Cenevre Sözleşmesi ve Mültecilerin Hukuki Statüsüne Yönelik 1967 Prokolüne göre mülteci olarak kabul edilmemektedirler. Türkiye'nin uygulamış olduğu coğrafi kısıtlama maddesi sebebiyle

sadece Avrupa'dan yapılan sığınma başvuruları olumlu sonuçlandığında mülteci statüsü verilmektedir. Bu yüzden Türkiye'nin ev sahipliği yapmış olduğu yaklaşık olarak 4 milyon Suriyeli, her ne kadar medya ve diğer söylemlerde mülteci olarak adlandırılırsalar da mültecilik statüsüne sahip değillerdir.

Bu tezde Kolombiya ve Türkiye vakaları incelenmeden önce tarih boyunca göç ve göçle ilgili kavramların nasıl literatürde yer aldığı üzerinde durulmuştur. Göç çok geniş dinamiklere sahip olduğu için sosyal bilimler dışında da literatürde yer almıştır. Fakat bu tezin araştırma kısmında sosyal bilimler literatüründe nasıl yer aldığı üzerinde durulmuştur. Öncelikle köleliğin ortaya çıkmasıyla beraber özellikle Afrika'dan kökeler çalışmaları için Avrupa gibi daha zengin kıtalar göç etmeye zorlanmışlardır. Daha sonrasında dünyanın tecrübe ettiği en büyük iki savaş olan Birinci ve İkinci Dünya Savaşları sonucunda, değişen yeni düzenler sebebiyle milyonlarca insan göç etmek zorunda kalmışlardır. Görüldüğü gibi göçün nedenleri sebebiyle farklı motivasyonlarla kitleler göç etmek durumunda kalmışlardır. Savaş yüzünden yerinden edilmiş kişilere dünya savaşıyla oluşan işçi açığını kapatmak için işçi göçü de eklemiştir. İnsanlar daha az gelişmiş ülkelere daha fazla gelişmiş, işçi ihtiyacının olduğu, ülkelere anlaşmalarla işçi göçü hareketlerinde bulunmuşlardır. Göç kavramının daha geniş incelenebilmesi ve bu tezin vakalarının oluşturmuş olduğu politikaların daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için; göçmen, mülteci, varış ve transit ülkeler kavramları üzerinde de durulmuştur. Evrensel olarak bir göçmen tanımı olmamakla birlikte mülteci tanımı dünyadaki çoğu ülkenin de taraf olduğu Mültecilerin Hukuki Statüsüne Yönelik 1951 Cenevre Sözleşmesi'nde açıkça yer almaktadır ve yer alan maddelere göre mültecilik statüsü sağlanmaktadır. Diğer taraftan varış ve transit ülke tanımları da evrensel olarak kabul edilmemektedir fakat uluslararası göç çalışmaları yapan Birleşmiş Milletler ajansları tarafından tanımlamaları bulunmaktadır.

Bunların dışında bu tezin ana taşlarından olan geçici koruma statüsünün ortaya çıkmasına sebep olan geçici koruma yönetmeliğini ortaya Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılması sonucu kitlesel göç hareketleri eklenmiştir. Yugoslavya Krizi'nin ortaya çıkması ve kitlelerin politik ve şiddet sebebiyle göç etme eğilimleri Avrupa devletlerini yeni göç politikası oluşturmaya itmiştir. Bu yüzden de Avrupa'nın taraf olduğu Mültecilerin Hukuki Statüsüne Yönelik 1951 Sözleşmesi Yugoslavya ve

Kosova krizlerine Avrupa'nın istediği gibi cevap veremediği için yeni ve geçici bir koruma sistemine ihtiyaç duyulmuştur. Sonuç olarak UNHCR'in yönlendirmesiyle eski Yugoslavya'da yaşanan olaylar neticesiyle yerinden olmuş kişilere, Avrupa'da geçici koruma statüsü verilmiş ve bu kişilerin Avrupa devletlerinde barınma, okuma, çalışma, sağlık hizmetlerinden faydalanma gibi temel haklara erişimlerine olanak sağlanmıştır. Fakat her geçici koruma kanununda olduğu gibi bu olanaklardan yerinden olma durumu ortadan kalkana kadar faylanamaları maddesi eklenmiştir. Bu sayede devletler kapasitelerini aşacak statülerden kaçınmış, kriz çözülene kadar yerinden edilmiş kişilere insan hakları çerçevesinde yaşamaları için uygun bir ortam yaratacak geçici statü sağlanmıştır. Eski Yugoslavya örneğinin dışında 1999-2005 yılları arasında Almanya, Danimarka ve Avustralya'da geçici koruma statüsü kapsamında kişilere barınma hakkı vermiştir. Fakat her geçici koruma kendi dinamiklerini içermektedir. Bu yüzden de bazı ülkeler mevcut yasalarını kullanarak geçici (geçici) temelli yeni kavramlar uygularken, bazı eyaletler kitlesel göç durumları için geçici korumaya özgü yasalar geliştirmiştir. Bu nedenle geçici koruma altındaki kişilere tanınan haklar geçici koruma uygulamalarında farklılık göstermektedir. Geçici koruma ilkesinin, şu anda dünyada yaşanmakta olan Venezüella ve Suriye'deki kitlesel göç krizi gibi diğer krizleri değerlendirirken geri göndermeme ilkesini kapsayıp kapsamadığı çok önemlidir. Geri göndermeme ilkesi, menşe ülkede kitlesel göçe neden olan durum ortadan kalkıncaya kadar geçici koruma uygulanmasını kapsar. Dolayısıyla bu ilke, devletleri bugün bile geçici koruma uygulamasına götüren bir yükümlülük olarak değerlendirilebilir. Ancak kriz devam ederse, geri göndermeme ilkesiyle sığınmacıların kriz devam edene kadar geri gönderilmemelerine izin verilmektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında geri göndermeme ilkesi ülkeler için bir yük olarak değerlendirilebilir.

Her iki ülkenin, Türkiye ve Kolombiya, aslında benzer şekilde kitlesel göç hareketlerine cevap vermesinin altında bu iki göç hareketinin de geçiciliğini kabul etmeleri yatmaktadır. Ülkeler kendi kaynakları ve sosyal yapıları bakımından bu derece büyük kitlesel göç hareketleriyle başa çıkabilecek konumda değildirler. Bu yüzden de krize olabildiğince yatıştırıcı, yumuşak ve geçici yöntemlerle cevap vermektedirler. Bu yüzden de öncelikle 2014 yılında Türkiye daha sonrasında 2018

yılında Kolombiya geçici koruma statüsü adı altında göç politikalarını şekillendirmeye başlamış ve günümüzde de devam etmektedir.

Kolombiya'nın göç politikasını geçici koruma üzerinden şekillendirmesine giden yolda ülkenin yaşamış veya yaşamakta olduğu dinamikler de etkili olmuştur. Venezüella ile komşu olan ve aynı dil ve benzer kültüre sahip olan Kolombiya-Venezüella arasında tarihsel olarak bir göç etkileşimi yer almaktadır. Venezüella'dan Kolombiya'ya kitlesel göç hareketleri yaşanmadan önce, Kolombiya'dan Venezüelle'ya çalışma, çatışmadan kaçma veya daha iyi bir yaşama erişme gibi farklı motivasyonlar göç dalgaları yaşanmıştır. Kolombiya'nın tecrübe etmiş olduğu siyasi darbeler, farklı gruplar arasındaki çatışmalar ve ekonomik sorunlar bir dönem Kolombiyalıların göç etmesine sebep olmuştur. Özellikle hükümet dışı gruplardan olan FARC ile hükümetin çatışmaları sonucunda ülkede hem sosyal, hem siyasi, hem de ekonomik sorunlar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunun dışında ülkedeki yasadışı gelir kaynağı olan uyuşturucu sonucu ortaya çıkan gerilim ve çatışmalar da sosyal ve siyasi hayat üzerinde büyük etkiye sahiptir. Bunların sonucunda farklı dönemlerde 1965 yılından 2000'li yıllara kadar ters bir göç akışı yaşanmıştır. 2010'lu yıllara gelindiğinde ise Venezüella'da yaşanan olaylar göç akışını tersine çevirmiştir. Ülkede yaşanan ciddi ekonomik sorunlar, siyasi sorunlar ve bu sorunların neticesinde ülkeye uygulanan yaptırımlar sonucunda Venezüellalılar daha iyi yaşam koşulları için özellikle komşusu Kolombiya olmak üzere Latin Amerika'nın farklı ülkelerine göç etmişlerdir. Ülkenin yaşamış olduğu sorunlar sonucunda insanlar en insani ihtiyaçlarını giderememeye başlamışlardır. Özellikle yaptırımlar sonucu ithal olarak ülkeye girişi sağlanan medikal ürünlere erişilememesi ülkenin sağlık hizmetlerini büyük sekteye uğratmıştır. Diğer taraftan yaşanan siyasi sorunlar sonucunda çoğunlukla ABD tarafından uygulanan yaptırımlar ülkenin en büyük gelir kaynağı olan petrolün ihracatında küçülmelere ve dolayısıyla ülke hazinesinin küçülmesine sebep olmuştur. Sonuç olarak beş milyonun üzerinde Venezüellalı ülkesini terk ederek başka ülkelere göç etmek durumunda kalmıştır. Bu çalışmada, Kolombiya'nın göç politikası tepkisi olarak geliştirdiği geçici koruma statüsünün kavramsal ve içerik olarak daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için Venezüellalı ve Kolombiyalıların demografik, sosyal ve eğitim açısından karşılaştırılmasına yer verilmiştir. Büyük çoğunluğa ev sahipliği yapan Kolombiya nüfusuna bakıldığı zaman gelen Venezüellılara göre eğitim seviyesi

olarak daha altta kaldıkları görülmüştür. Venezüellalıların yaş aralığına bakıldığı zaman çoğunun genç nüfusa sahip olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Yani ülkeye gelen Venezüellalıların büyük çoğunluğu genç, eğitilmiş ve çalışmaya uygun kişilerdir. Bunların dışında Kolombiya'ya göç eden Venezüellalıların çoğu ev shaibi topluma göre üniversite bitirme oranında daha yüksektir. Cinsiyet olarak dağılımlarına bakıldığı zaman kadın ve erkek oranlarında ciddi bir açık bulunmamaktadır. Kolombiya ev sahipliği yaptığı bu topluma ve kendi toplumun ihtiyaçlarına cevap verebilmek için kümülatif bir geçici koruma politikası oluşturmuştur.

Venezüellalılar üzerinden Kolombiya göç politikasına bakıldığı zaman, ilk olarak gelen kişiler için geçici kamplar oluşturulduğu ve temel hizmetler sağlandığı görülmüştür. Sonrasında Kolombiya'nın öncelikli olarak özel ikamet izni (PEP) sağladığı görülmektedir. Bu sayede Venezüellalılar belgelendirilmiş ve kayıt altına alınmaya başlanmıştır. Bu sayede belgesiz veya kaçak olarak geçişlerin önüne geçebilmek hedeflenmiştir. Fakat 2018 itibari ile Kolombiya'ya giriş yapmış Venezüellalıların özel ikametgah izinlerini alabilmek için geçerli bir pasaporta sahip olmaları gerekmektedir. Bu madde de yasadışı girişlerin önünü alma konusunda çok başarılı olmamıştır. PEP statüsü elde edebilmek için temel hatlarıyla: Kolombiya topraklarına damgalı pasaportla girmek ve göçmenlik kontrol noktası tarafından kontrol edilmek, ulusal ve uluslararası alanda temiz bir sabıka kaydına sahip olmak, herhangi bir sınır dışı etme durumuna sahip olmamak. PEP'in iki aşamasını uyguladıktan sonra, 2018'de Kolombiyalı yetkililer, çoğu Venezüellalının Kolombiya'ya girmek için yasadışı yollar kullandığını ve ulusal pasaport kontrol hizmetlerini geçmediğini fark etti. Bu yüzden PEP geliştirilerek, ihtiyaca yönelik ek maddelerle güncellenmiştir. Geliştirilmiş haliyle Venezüellalıların çalışma izni, eğitim hizmetlerinden herhangi bir belge göstermeden faydalanma ve okullara kayıt olma hakkı verilmiştir. Tüm bu gelişmeler ve güncellemeler Venezüellalıların için geçici koruma statüsüne (TPS) giden yolu şekillendirmiş ve en sonunda geçici koruma statüsü sağlanmıştır. TPS ile ülkede yer alan tüm Venezüellalıların bu statüye dahil olması ve kayıt altına alınması hedeflenmiştir. TSP sistemi ücretsiz ve online olarak başlatılmıştır. Sisteme kayıt olan her başvuru sahibinin parmak izni, fotoğrafı alınmış ve değerlendirmeler sonucunda olumlu adaylara TPS verilmiştir. Kolombiya'da TPS'e sahip Venezüellalıların oy verme dışında temel olarak Kolombiyalıların yararlandığı

çoęu haktan faydalanabiliyorlar. Vergi ödüyorlar, okullara kayıt olabiliyorlar, saęlık hizmetinden faydalanabiliyorlar ve lke sınırları ierisinde doęan ocuklar vatandaşlık alabiliyorlar.

Trkiye'nin geici koruma statsne giden yolunu inceledięimiz zaman Trkiye'nin tecrbe ettięi g hareketlerinin ve g politikalarının etkili olduęunu gryoruz. Trkiye, coęrafi konumu gereęi kurulduęu gnden itibaren hem g alan hem g veren bir lke olmuştur. zellikle Ortadoęu'da yaşıanan geliřmeler sonucunda birok İranlı, Iraklı Trkiye'ye g etmiştir. Bunların dıřında Balkanlar'da yaşıanan geliřmeler neticesinde, Bořnaklar, Arnavutlar, Tatarlar, Kosovalılar, erkezler gibi farklı etnik kkenlerden binlerce insan topraklarını terk ederek Trkiye'ye gelmek zorunda kalmışlardır. Trkiye gelen bu kitlelere geici sığınma hakkı vererek karřılıklı vermiştir. Bunların dıřında 2000'li yıllarda ABD'nin Irak ve Afganistan'a mdahalesi insanları yerinden etmiş ve binlerce insan Trkiye'ye kamak durumunda kalmıştır. O dnemde İran, Irak ve Afganistan'dan gelenler tam mlteci stats almışlardır. 1989 yılında ise Sovyetler Birlięi'nin daęılmasıyla birlikte Rusya, Romanya ve Ukrayna gibi lkelerden de ekonomik kořullar ve siyasi baskı nedeniyle i Trkiye'ye g yaşıanmıştır. Trkiye g alan bir lke olduęu kadar aynı zamanda g veren bir lkedir. 1950'li yılların bařlarında bařta Almanya ve İngiltere olmak zere iři yaşıanmıştır. Trkiye'den yzbinlerce kiři alıřmak iin yapılan anlaşmalarla farklı lkelere iři g altında g etmişlerdir. Batı'ya olan gn dıřında, Trkiye'den Libya ve Irak gibi bazı Orta Doęu lkelerine ve Rusya'ya da iři ihtiyacını karřılamak iin gler olmuştur. O zamandan beri Trkiye bir g lkesi konumundan g kaynaęı bir lke konumuna gemiştir. Fakat Trkiye'nin tecrbe ettięi en byk kitlesel hareket Suriye İ Savařı sonucunda Trkiye'ye sığınmış Suriyelilerle bařlamış ve etkilerini devam ettirmektedir. Trkiye tecrbe ettięi tm bu kriz ve geliřmeler sonucunda mevcut g politikalarını glendirmeye ve krizle bařa ıkmak iin yeni yaklařımlar retmeye odaklanmıştır.

Trkiye'nin g politikası, Suriyelilerin geliřinden sonra geici koruma statsn oluřturmaya ynelik bir řekilde řekillenmiştir. Suriyeliler gelmeden nceki tm gmen hareketleri kk bir nfusu kapsadıkları iin bir řekilde ya Trkiye'yi terk etmiş ya da topluma entegre olmuşlardır. Ancak Suriye'deki durum dięer

hareketlerden tamamen farklı ve etkileri diğer ülkelerle dış ilişkiler ve iç politika gibi farklı yönlerde görülmektedir. Durumun üstesinden gelmek için Türkiye, Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler için özel bir göç politikası oluşturup uygulamaya başlamıştır ve “geçici koruma” adı verilen bir terim üreterek durumun “geçiciliğini” vurgulamıştır. Türkiye Suriye krizi ile başlayan kitlesel göç dalgasına hızlı bir şekilde cevap vermiştir. Örneğin 2011'den itibaren Türkiye Suriyeliler için kamplar kurmaya başlamış ve Türkiye'ye giriş yapanlara bu kamplarda temel ihtiyaçları sağlanmıştır. Hatay, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Kilis gibi Suriye sınırındaki ilçelerde çadır kentler kurulmuştur. Bu dönemde Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde göç konusunda tam olarak işleyen bir göç idaresi dairesi bulunmadığından, merkezlerin sorumluluğu Başbakanlığa bağlı Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı'na (AFAD) verilmiştir.

2013 yılında Türkiye, geçici koruma çerçevesinde tanımlanmış özel statü sağlamak için Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma (YUKK) hakkında 6458'i duyurmuştur. 6458 sayılı yasa ile Suriyelilere; okuma, çalışma ve sağlık hizmetlerine erişim izni gibi temel haklar sağlanmıştır. Bu kanunda geçici korumanın tanımı tanımlanmıştır. Bu yasanın uygulanması, Türkiye'deki mülteci uygulamalarının bir yansımasıdır. Hatta Türk makamlarının benimsediği açık kapı politikası tanımlanmıştır. Geçici koruma politikasının geri göndermeme ilkesi belirtilmiştir. Mültecilerin geri göndermeme ilkesini kabul etmek, uyum, sosyal uyum ve sürdürülebilirlik fikrini beraberinde getirmiştir. Geri göndermeme ise şu şekilde tanımlanmıştır ve Suriye'de yaşanan ve sığınmaya sebep olan olaylar bitene kadar Suriyelilerin ülkelerine gönderilmeyeceği belirtilmiştir. Türkiye'de kalmaları için sahip olmaları gereken geçici koruma statüsünden kimlerin yararlanacağı ise Bakanlar Kurulu'nun kararları ile belirlenmiştir. Geçici koruma başvuruları online olarak gerçekleşmiş ve kişilerin parmak izleri ve kimlikleri sisteme kayıt ettirilmiştir. Geçici koruma sahibi alan Suriyeliler Türkiye'de oturma, okuma, sağlık hizmetlerinden yararlanma ve çalışma izni gibi haklardan faydalanmaktadırlar. Fakat Kolombiya'da yaşanan geçici koruma statüsü ile verilen çalışma hakkından farklı olarak, Türkiye'deki Suriyelilerin çalışma izni alabilmeleri için işverenin başvuru yapması gerekmektedir. Temel hizmetlerden faydalanma gibi haklar tanınsa da Türkiye'de başvuruların reddi durumları gerçekleşmektedir ve bu red hakkı valiliklere verilmiştir. Bunun dışında diğer bir kısıtlama Suriyeliler yalnızca geçici koruma statüsünün alındığı ve kayıt oldukları

şehirle kısıtlanmıştır. Kayıt altına alınması gereken Suriyeli sayısı oldukça fazla olduğu için 4 milyon Suriyelinin kayıt altına alınması yaklaşık olarak 3 yıl sürmüştür ve 2018 ve 2019 yıllarında yapılan değişiklikler sonucunda geçici koruma statüsü karar yetkisi cumhurbaşkanı olarak değiştirilmiştir. Suriyeliler geçici koruma kimliği aldıktan sonra bazı temel haklara sahip olurlar ancak bu Türk vatandaşlığı aldıkları anlamına gelmemektedir. Hatta Türkiye'de doğan çocuklara TC kimlik belgesi verilmemektedir.

Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler de son yıllarda göçün bir güvenlik aracı haline gelmesinden bu yana milyonlarca Suriyeli için ev sahibi topluluk olarak Türkiye'nin AB ile ilişkilerini değiştirmiştir, AB, Türkiye gibi çok sayıda Suriyeliye ev sahipliği yapan üçüncü ülkelerle işbirliğini artırmıştır. Birlik sınırlarına olası düzensiz göç hareketlerini önlemek için mülteciler. Asya veya Afrika'dan gelen göçmenlerin yasa dışı yollardan Avrupa'ya geçmek için Türkiye'yi bir göç koridoru olarak kullanması, AB'nin politikalarını sınırlarının ötesinde şekillendirmesine neden olmuştur. AB ve Türkiye'nin sınır komşusu olması nedeniyle göç konusunun Avrupa ülkeleri arasında güvenleleştirilmesi, Türkiye'nin bir aktör olarak önemini artırmıştır.

Kolombiya ve Türkiye örnekleri karşılaştırıldığı zaman, her iki ülkenin göç ve göçmenlik tarihlerine baktığımızda hem farklılıkları hem de benzerlikleri gözlemliyoruz. Her iki ülke de bir zamanlar hem göç veren hem de göç alan ülkelerdi. Ama şimdi durum Venezüellalılar ve Suriyelilerle karşılaştırıldığında farklıdır. 1900'lerin sonunda Kolombiya Venezuela'ya göç ederken, Türkiye'den Suriye'ye göç yaşanmamıştır. Kolombiya ve Venezuela arasında tarih boyunca bir göç akışı olmasına rağmen, Suriye İç Savaşı öncesinde 1995-2013 yılları arasında Suriye'den sadece 635 kişi Türkiye'ye göç etmiştir.

Hem Venezuela hem de Suriye'den göç çoğunlukla komşu ülkelere gerçekleşti ve göç yolculuklarını yaya olarak gerçekleştirmişlerdir. Bu da Türkiye ve Kolombiya sınırlarını yaya olarak geçtikleri anlamına gelmektedir. Buradan açık kapı politikasının hem Türk hem de Kolombiya makamları tarafından uygulandığı açıkça anlaşılmaktadır. Uyguladıkları açık kapı politikası sonucunda önce küçük kitleler halinde gelen mülteciler, belli bir süre sonra kitlesel bir göç akımı halinde gelmişlerdir.

Bu durum ülkelerin kitlesel göç kriziyle başa çıkmak için yeni göç politikaları oluşturmasına neden olmuştur. Her iki ülkede de taraf oldukları uluslararası anlaşmalara göre gelen kitlelere mülteci statüsü sağlamamıştır ve geçici koruma statüsü vermiştir.

Suriyelilerin ve Venezuelalıların eğitim düzeyleri karşılaştırıldığında, Türkiye'deki Suriyelilerin eğitim düzeyi Kolombiya'daki Venezuelalılarından daha düşüktür. Diğer bir fark ise Venezuelalıları barındıran Kolombiyalıların eğitim oranının Kolombiyalılarından daha düşük olmasıdır. Ancak Suriyelilere ev sahipliği yapan Türkler için durum tam tersidir ve Türklerin eğitim oranı Suriyeli nüfustan daha yüksektir. Venezuelalıların en az %40'ı orta öğretime sahipken, orta öğretimi tamamlayan Suriyelilerin oranı %22'dir. Suriyelilerin eğitim profili incelendiğinde 2017 yılından itibaren yapılan araştırmalar eğitim durumunda düşüş olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. İki grup için eğitim durumunda ciddi farklılıklar görülmektedir. İki grup arasında eğitim düzeyinde farklılıklar olduğu açıkça ortadadır ancak geçici koruma statüsü kapsamında benzer eğitim politikalarının uygulandığı dikkat çekmektedir. Çünkü hem Kolombiya'da hem de Türkiye'de geçici koruma statüsü alan kişiler, geçici koruma statüsü belgeleri ile okullara kayıt olabilmekte ve eğitim hakkından yararlanabilmektedir. Ancak Kolombiya'da son yıllarda farklı bir uygulama başlatılmıştır ve artık kimliksiz çocukların ilkokula kaydolmasına izin verilmeye başlanmıştır. Bu durumda Kolombiya'nın geçici koruma statüsünde eğitim alanında iyileştirmeler yapıldığı fark edilmektedir.

Kolombiya'da halihazırda ev sahibi toplumdaki daha iyi bir eğitim geçmişine sahip olan Venezuelalıları, aynı zamanda iyi bir teknik ve profesyonel geçmişe sahiptir. Nüfusun genç olması ve teknik becerilere sahip olması Venezuelalıların çalışma hayatına katılması için uygun bir zemin oluşturmaktadır. Örneğin iş hayatına katılımları karşılaştırıldığında Venezuelalıların %40'ı çalışma yaşı aralığındadır (. Suriyeliler düşünüldüğünde bu oranın %50'den fazla olduğu dikkat çekmektedir. Çalışmaya uygun yaş grubundaki bu iki nüfusa geçici koruma statüsü kapsamında çalışma izni sağlanmıştır. Suriyeliler, geçici koruma statüsü aldıktan altı ay sonra Çalışma Bakanlığı'na başvurarak çalışma izni başvurusunda bulunabilirler. Kolombiya'da geçici koruma statüsünün alınması üç yıla kadar sürdüğü için

Venezuelalılar geçici koruma statüsü almadan geçerli vizeleri olsa bile çalışma izni alabilmektedirler. Her iki ülkenin de geçici koruma kapsamında çalışma izni almasındaki temel motivasyon, kayıt dışı çalışan sayısını azaltmaktır. Bunun dışında her iki ülkenin de temel haklara erişim benzer yollarla sağlanmaktadır. Bu temel haklara erişmek için uyguladıkları süreç de çok benzer. Geçici korumaya başvurma biçimleri, ücretsiz kayıt olmaları, bu süreçte sağlık ve diğer temel haklara erişimleri gibi pek çok benzerlik vardır. Kolombiya, Venezuelalılara geçici koruma sağlıyor.

Vatandaşlıkla ilgili olarak Kolombiya, Kolombiya'da doğan Venezüellalı çocuklara vatandaşlık verirken, Türkiye Suriyelilere vatandaşlık vermemektedir. Türkiye'de doğan çocuklar Suriye'den vatandaşlık alabilirlerse Suriye vatandaşı oluyorlar. Bu iki farklı uygulamadan hangisinin daha iyi olduğunu söylemek mümkün değildir. Ancak sonuçlar uzun vadede analiz edilebilir. Çünkü vatandaşlık verildiği durumlarda ülkelerin demografik yapısı değişirken, vatandaşlığın verilmesi entegrasyon hızlandırıcı bir etken olabilir. Aynı zamanda Kolombiya on yıl oturma izni verdikten sonra daimi oturma izni verebiliyor ama Türkiye'de Suriyeliler için böyle bir uygulama yer almamaktadır.

Türkiye ve Suriye örneğinde ise sınır bölgeleri dışında her iki ülkenin de kültürel ve sosyal açıdan birbirine benzemediği görülmektedir. Çoğunluğun aynı dini benimsemiş olmasına rağmen farklı dilleri ve kültürel farklılıkları konuşmaları dikkat çekicidir. Farklı ve benzer toplumlardan göç alan iki ülkenin benzer bir göç politikası ile karşılık verdiği araştırılmaya değer durumlardır. Her iki ülke de Venezuelalıları ve Suriyelileri ne kadar benzer veya farklı olursa olsun geçici olarak görüyor ve bu nedenle göç krizlerine geçici koruma statüsüyle yanıt veriyorlar. Geçici koruma yönetmeliği ile hükümetler mültecilere sağlık ve barınma gibi hizmetleri otomatik olarak sunarken aynı zamanda geri göndermeme ilkesini de benimsiyorlar.

Sonuç olarak, Kolombiya'daki geçici koruma statüsü Türkiye'den daha kapsamlı ve Venezüellalıları için daha fazla hak içeriyor. Öte yandan Türkiye'nin Suriyeliler konusunda daha açık ve kapsamlı çalışmaları vardır. Erdoğan'ın yayınladığı Suriye Barometreleri, mülteci topluluğunun ihtiyacı hakkında daha fazla veri literatürde yer alıyor. Bu çalışmanın dışında ulusal ve uluslararası STK'ların ve akademisyenlerin

Suriyeliler üzerinde yapmış olduđu çalışmaları, Kolombiya'da Venezüellalıları üzerinde yapılmış çalışmalardan daha fazla ve daha kapsamlıdır. Dünya tarihinin en önemli iki göç hareketi olan Venezuela ve Suriye etkilerini tüm dünyada hissettirmektedir. Bu iki krizden en çok etkilenen Kolombiya ve Türkiye uygulamaya çalıştıkları politikalarla krizin üstesinden gelmeye çalışmaktadırlar. Bu iki ülke farklı coğrafyalarda aynı krizin ortasında olsalar da benzer politikalar yürütmektedirler. Uygulanan politikaların başarısız olarak değerlendirilmesi kitlelerin büyüklüğü gözde alındığında çok doğru değildir. Bu kadar çok sayıda göçmene ev sahipliği yapan ülkelerin krizi tam olarak çözmesi mümkün değildir. Özellikle her iki ülkenin de ekonomik ve siyasi sorunlar yaşıyor olması göçmen krizi politikalarını etkilediği göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır. Nihai olarak Kolombiya ve Türkiye dünyanın iki farklı kıtasında aynı zamanda, benzer kitlesel göç hareketlerine benzer ve acil olarak tepki vermektedirler. Bu yüzden uygulamış oldukları politikalar daha yumuşak, geçişi kolay sağlayabilen, toplumlar arası gerilime sebep olmayacak, geçici ve krizlerin etkisini en aza indirebilmeyi hedefleyen politikalarlardır. Uygulanan politikaların makro ve mikro etkilerinin ilerleyen yıllarda daha fazla ortaya çıkacağı şüphesizdir.fakat şu unutulmamalıdır ki OAS Genel Sekreterinin de söylediği gibi "Hiçbir ülke bu göçmen ve mülteci dalgasıyla tek başına baş edemez".

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